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THE NORMATIVE AND HISTORICAL CASES FOR 
PROPORTIONAL DEPORTATION 
Angela M. Banks* 
ABSTRACT 
Is citizenship status a legitimate basis for allocating rights in the United 
States? 
In immigration law the right to remain in the United States is significantly 
tied to citizenship status. Citizens have an absolutely secure right to remain in 
the United States regardless of their actions. Noncitizens’ right to remain is 
less secure because they can be deported if convicted of specific criminal 
offenses. This Article contends that citizenship is not a legitimate basis for 
allocating the right to remain. This Article offers normative and historical 
arguments for a right to remain for noncitizens. This right should be granted to 
members of the society—those with significant connections, commitment, and 
obligations to the State. Citizenship status is one proxy for identifying 
members, but it can be both under- and over-inclusive. Numerous green card 
holders are committed to, have strong connections to, and undertake 
obligations to the United States. Deporting these individuals for crimes like 
perjury, receipt of stolen property, or failure to appear in court can be 
excessively harsh. It can mean depriving “a man and his family of all that 
makes life worth while [sic].” Deportation should only be utilized when it is a 
proportionate response to criminal activity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Gerardo Antonio Mosquera, Sr. was a green card holder in the United 
States for twenty-nine years before he was deported to a country where he 
barely spoke the language.1 At the age of twenty-nine, after residing in the 
United States for almost twenty years, he sold a $10 bag of marijuana to a paid 
police informant.2 Gerardo was arrested and he pleaded guilty to the sale and 
 
 
1
 Patrick J. McDonnell, Deportation Shatters Family, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1998, at B1; see also JOSEPH 
NEVINS, OPERATION GATEKEEPER AND BEYOND: THE WAR ON “ILLEGALS” AND THE REMAKING OF THE U.S.–
MEXICO BOUNDARY 180 (2d ed. 2010). Gerardo immigrated to the United States as a lawful permanent 
resident in 1969 from Colombia. McDonnell, supra. He came to the United States with his mother and five 
siblings to join his father, who was working as a car dealer. Id. 
 
2
 McDonnell, supra note 1. 
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transportation of 0.6 grams of marijuana.3 He was sentenced to ninety days in 
jail, three years’ probation, and a $150 fine.4 Gerardo served his sentence and 
paid his fine. His crime constituted an aggravated felony under the 1996 
reforms to the Immigration and Nationality Act.5 Having an aggravated felony 
conviction meant that he was deportable and ineligible for discretionary relief.6 
No judge heard about Gerardo’s twenty-nine years of lawful residence in the 
United States, his U.S. citizen children and wife, his employment record, or the 
hardship that his family would experience if Gerardo were deported.7 There 
was no relief available to Gerardo, and he was removed from the United States 
in December 1997.8 
The outcome of this case would have been very different for someone like 
a hypothetical Antoinette. She was born in the United States but raised in 
England since the age of two. Her entire family lives in England and 
Antoinette has spent no time in the United States since her departure. At the 
age of twenty-five she decided to pursue graduate studies in the United States. 
If, after being in the United States for one year, Antoinette sold a $10 bag of 
marijuana to a paid police informant, she would not be at risk of being 
removed to England because she is a U.S. citizen. Pursuant to the Fourteenth 
Amendment, her birth in the United States makes her a U.S. citizen.9 She 
would only be subject to a criminal sentence similar to what Gerardo faced: 
ninety days in jail, three years’ probation, and a $150 fine. Gerardo arguably 
has stronger connections to the United States, and thus a stronger liberty 
interest in remaining in the United States than Antoinette. Antoinette however 
is the one with the right to remain. 
In this Article I argue that the right to remain should not depend on 
citizenship status. The right to remain should be granted to members of the 
society—those with significant connections, commitment, and obligations to 
the State. Citizenship status is one proxy for identifying members, but it can be 
 
 
3
 Id.  
 
4
 Id. 
 
5
 Id. 
 
6
 Id. 
 
7
 See id. (noting that the revisions subjected noncitizen offenders to deportation regardless of the amount 
of illicit drugs sold, whereas previous law allowed offenders to demonstrate countervailing factors such as 
strong U.S. family ties). The family depended on Gerardo’s $300-a-week salary, and they were struggling to 
survive on his wife Maria’s salary as a school bus driver. See id. Gerardo’s son, Gerardo Anthony Mosquera, 
Jr., went into a deep depression after his father’s deportation and killed himself. Id.  
 
8
 Id.  
 
9
 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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both under- and over-inclusive, as demonstrated by Gerardo and Antoinette. 
Numerous green card holders, like Gerardo, are committed to, have strong 
connections to, and undertake obligations to the United States.10 Deporting 
these individuals for crimes like perjury, receipt of stolen property, or failure to 
appear in court can be excessively harsh.11 It can mean depriving “a man and 
his family of all that makes life worth while [sic].”12 Deportation should only 
be utilized when it is a proportionate response to criminal activity. This Article 
extends my prior work on proportional deportation. I have previously argued 
that the punitive nature of crime-based deportation can give rise to a 
substantive due process right to proportionality.13 This Article offers normative 
and historical arguments for proportionality in crime-based deportation. 
The use of different proxies, such as length of residence, family 
connections, or service to local, state, or national communities, can better 
ensure that green card holders’ liberty interest in remaining in the United 
States is adequately protected.14 This was the approach utilized in the United 
States’ first comprehensive crime-based deportation regime, and it can be 
utilized today through complex rule-like directives.15 
 
 
10
 This Article focuses on the right to remain for green card holders, also referred to as lawful permanent 
residents (LPRs). I leave for another day whether the analysis for other noncitizens, such as unauthorized 
migrants, would be the same. 
 
11
 See Angela M. Banks, Proportional Deportation, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1651 (2009) (discussing the need 
for proportionality in deportation); Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1685–88 
(2009) (same); Michael J. Wishnie, Proportionality: The Struggle for Balance in U.S. Immigration Policy, 72 
U. PITT. L. REV. 431 (2011) (same). 
 
12
 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 600 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The deportation of 
such connected residents is also negatively impacting the health, education, and financial security of American 
families. See JONATHAN BAUM, ROSHA JONES & CATHERINE BARRY, IN THE CHILD’S BEST INTEREST? THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF LOSING A LAWFUL IMMIGRANT PARENT TO DEPORTATION (2010), available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Human_Rights_report.pdf; AJAY CHAUDRY ET AL., URBAN INST., FACING 
OUR FUTURE: CHILDREN IN THE AFTERMATH OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT (2010), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412020_FacingOurFuture_final.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FORCED 
APART: FAMILIES SEPARATED AND IMMIGRANTS HARMED BY UNITED STATES DEPORTATION POLICY 4, 51–52, 
61–63, 69, 82 (2007); Jacqueline Hagan et al., The Effects of U.S. Deportation Policies on Immigrant Families 
and Communities: Cross-Border Perspectives, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1799 (2010). 
 
13
 Banks, supra note 11. 
 
14
 In this Article I argue that proxies other than citizenship status should be used to identify residents 
whose right to remain should be protected. I do not, however, argue that citizens’ right to remain should be 
subjected to the same proxies. See infra text accompanying notes 337, 339 for additional discussion of limiting 
citizens’ right to remain. 
 
15
 See infra Part V.B for a discussion of complex rule-like directives that utilize alternative proxies for 
connections, commitment, and obligations to a polity. 
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Building on the work of citizenship scholars, I contend that citizenship 
status is an under-inclusive proxy for significant connections, commitment, 
and obligations to a State.16 Citizenship scholars have explored the meaning of 
citizenship in Western democracies and how citizenship rights should be 
allocated.17 Many of these scholars have concluded that numerous rights 
exclusively allocated to citizens should be accessible to noncitizens through 
increased access to citizenship.18 I take a different approach in this Article and 
argue that the right to remain should not depend on citizenship status. 
This argument proceeds in five parts. Part I describes the current crime-
based deportation regime and the harsh consequences it creates for long-term 
green card holders and their families. Part II presents a normative argument for 
expanding green card holders’ right to remain in the United States. This 
argument is based on Ayelet Shachar’s jus nexi framework for identifying 
members of a polity and the idea that noncitizens have a liberty interest in 
remaining in the United States.19 I contend that deporting members for minor 
criminal activity is an illegitimate deprivation of the liberty interest to remain 
in the United States because it is disproportionate. Within Part II, I respond to 
concerns that my approach to the right to remain may devalue American 
citizenship. Part III demonstrates that our first comprehensive post-entry 
 
 
16
 See, e.g., SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS (2004); 
LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 82–93 (2006); 
JOSEPH H. CARENS, IMMIGRANTS AND THE RIGHT TO STAY (2010); HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN 
WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006); AYELET 
SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY (2009); PETER J. SPIRO, 
BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER GLOBALIZATION (2008); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF 
JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983); Joseph H. Carens, The Case for Amnesty, BOS. 
REV., May/June 2009, at 7. 
 
17
 See, e.g., BOSNIAK, supra note 16, at 82–93; CARENS, supra note 16; DAVID JACOBSON, RIGHTS 
ACROSS BORDERS: IMMIGRATION AND THE DECLINE OF CITIZENSHIP (1996); CHRISTIAN JOPPKE, CITIZENSHIP 
AND IMMIGRATION 28–30 (2010); SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF 
GLOBALIZATION (1996); PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS ON 
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP (1998); SHACHAR, supra note 16; YASEMIN NUHOĞLU SOYSAL, LIMITS OF 
CITIZENSHIP: MIGRANTS AND POSTNATIONAL MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPE (1994); SPIRO, supra note 16; Dimitry 
Kochenov, Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the Difficult Relationship Between Status 
and Rights, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 169, 214–34 (2009); see also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF 
JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 69–81 (2006) (discussing the capabilities approach 
to identifying core human entitlements). 
 
18
 See, e.g., JACOBSON, supra note 17; SCHUCK, supra note 17; SHACHAR, supra note 16; William Rogers 
Brubaker, Membership Without Citizenship: The Economic and Social Rights of Noncitizens, in IMMIGRATION 
AND THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 145 (William Rogers Brubaker ed., 1989). 
These scholars advocate increased access to citizenship for noncitizens rather than extending all of the rights 
currently coupled with citizenship status to noncitizens. See, e.g., Brubaker, supra. 
 
19
 See SHACHAR, supra note 16, at 16.  
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crime-based deportation regime was rooted in the proportionality principle. 
Part IV argues that reliance on the foundational norms of our crime-based 
deportation regime—connection and proportionality—has diminished and 
must be restored in order to have a more just deportation regime. Part V 
contends that citizenship status is an under- and over-inclusive proxy for 
membership that leaves numerous noncitizens’ liberty interest in remaining in 
the United States inadequately protected. I conclude that in order to achieve 
this goal the right to remain cannot depend on citizenship status. 
I. CRIME-BASED DEPORTATION 
Citizenship status has become increasingly important in protecting an 
individual’s liberty interest in remaining in the United States. United States 
citizens have an absolutely secure right to remain within the territorial 
boundaries of the United States.20 Green card holders, technically referred to as 
lawful permanent residents (LPRs), have a relatively secure right to remain 
within the territorial boundaries of the United States after being admitted.21 
This right is not absolutely secure because it is subject to certain conditions. 
LPRs can be removed from the United States based on the deportation grounds 
provided in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). All noncitizens, 
including LPRs, are deportable for violating immigration rules and engaging in 
a variety of criminal activities.22 One of the most important crime-based 
deportation grounds is conviction of an aggravated felony.23 In addition to 
being deportable, an individual with an aggravated felony conviction is 
generally ineligible for discretionary relief from deportation, prohibited from 
returning to the United States, eligible for expedited removal proceedings, and 
subject to mandatory detention while in removal proceedings.24  
 
 
20
 SCHUCK, supra note 17, at 167. 
 
21
 See id. 
 
22
 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2012). See infra text accompanying notes 262–66 for details regarding the number 
of noncitizens deported based on criminal activity and the type of criminal activity. 
 
23
 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (stating “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time 
after admission is deportable”). 
 
24
 Id. § 1182(a)(9)(A) (stating aggravated felons are inadmissible forever); id. § 1226(c)(1) (mandating 
detention during removal proceedings for aggravated felons); id. § 1228(a)(3) (providing for expedited 
proceedings); id. § 1229b(a)–(b) (making aggravated felons ineligible for cancellation of removal); id. 
§ 1231(b)(3)(B) (limiting access to withholding of removal). 
Individuals with an aggravated felony conviction are ineligible for Section 240A(a) cancellation of 
removal. Id. § 1229b(a). Individuals are ineligible for Section 240A(b) relief if they do not have good moral 
character, id. § 1229b(b)(1)(B), and Section 101(f) precludes the Attorney General from finding that an 
individual with an aggravated felony conviction has good moral character. Id. § 1101(f). Withholding of 
removal is generally available if the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be 
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Individuals like Gerardo face these possibilities.25 If aggravated felonies 
were crimes that were aggravated and felonies, then this outcome could be a 
proportionate response to criminal activity. The definition, however, is much 
broader. Aggravated felony is a term of art defined in the INA, and it can 
include state misdemeanors.26 The term was introduced in 1988 and it was 
originally limited to the serious crimes of murder, drug trafficking, and illicit 
trafficking in firearms and destructive devices.27 In the 1990s Congress 
significantly expanded the aggravated felony definition. Initial expansions used 
length of prison sentence to differentiate more serious crimes from less serious 
crimes. For example, a theft offense or crime of violence was only an 
aggravated felony if there was an imposed sentence of at least five years.28 The 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA) reduced that sentence to at least one year.29 The IIRIRA and other 
immigration reforms also added additional crimes to the aggravated felony 
 
threatened because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion. Id. § 1231(b)(3)(A). However, this relief is not available if the alien has been convicted “of a 
particularly serious crime [and thus] is a danger to the community of the United States.” Id. 
§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). Individuals with aggravated felony convictions fall into both of these categories. See id. 
§ 1231(b)(3)(B).  
An exception to this is the availability of a Section 212(h) waiver. This waiver is available for 
individuals with an aggravated felony conviction if they are not a lawful permanent resident. Id. § 1182(h)(2). 
Section 212(h) waives specific crime-based inadmissibility grounds and can be relevant in deportation 
proceedings when an individual is seeking to adjust from nonimmigrant to immigrant status. The Attorney 
General can grant this form of discretionary relief if deportation will result in “extreme hardship to the United 
States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien.” Id. § 1182(h)(1)(B). 
 
25
 Gerardo was prohibited from returning to the United States for his son’s funeral. McDonnell, supra 
note 1. Section 212(a)(9)(A)(i) of the INA prohibited his return and he was not granted a waiver. See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(9)(A)(i); McDonnell, supra note 1. 
 
26
 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43); Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws 
and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1939 (2000). 
 
27
 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469–70 (current version 
at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)). 
 
28
 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501, 104 Stat. 4978, 5048 (current version at 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, 
§ 222(a), 108 Stat. 4305, 4320–22 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)). 
 
29
 Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 321, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-627 to -28 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)). For example, a noncitizen with a shoplifting conviction who obtained a one-year 
suspended sentence has an aggravated felony conviction even if the crime would be considered a state 
misdemeanor. See Morawetz, supra note 26, at 1939, 1942. This outcome is due to the expanded definition of 
an aggravated felony and the new definition of a term of imprisonment adopted in IIRIRA. See id. at 1939 
n.16. A term of imprisonment now includes the period of time ordered by the court regardless of any time 
suspended or time actually served. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48). This further minimizes the usefulness of the 
imposed sentence as a proxy for seriousness. 
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definition like perjury and obstruction of justice.30 A significant number of 
noncitizens are subject to deportation based on an aggravated felony 
conviction not only because of the expanding definition, but also because of 
the retroactive application of this definition.31 Congress made the definition 
retroactive to facilitate administrative efficiency.32 Consequently long-term 
LPRs can be deported based on pre-1996 criminal activity that was not a 
deportable offense at the time the crime was committed.33 
Citizens like Antoinette avoid all of these consequences, but noncitizens 
like Gerardo face deportation without any opportunity to have their 
connections and contributions to the United States considered.34 Deportation is 
the guaranteed response to an aggravated felony conviction for most 
 
 
30
 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(e), 110 Stat. 
1214, 1277–78 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)). The definition of an aggravated felony was 
expanded several times between 1988 and 1996. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act § 321; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 440(e); Immigration and 
Nationality Technical Corrections Act § 222(a); Immigration Act of 1990 § 501. 
 
31
 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12, at 31. 
 
32
 See id. at 32. Without retroactivity federal immigration authorities would have to determine which 
aggravated felony definition applied to which noncitizens. Id. This additional step in determining deportability 
was predicted to require significant administrative resources and retroactivity eliminated this problem. See id. 
at 31–32. 
 
33
 Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 97, 106–18 (1998) [hereinafter Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation]; Morawetz, supra note 
26, at 1936–37. One might contend that LPRs should realize that their ability to reside in the United States 
could be threatened if they engage in criminal activity. While the 1996 reforms may have added new 
retroactive deportation grounds, all they did was make a broader range of criminal activity the basis for 
deportation. Thus the general security of LPRs residence rights remained unchanged. This would be a 
reasonable conclusion if it were reasonable to assume that any criminal activity constitutes a serious threat to 
public safety or national security. The crime-based deportation grounds before 1996, particularly the definition 
of an aggravated felony, were designed to remove noncitizens who engaged in criminal activity that was 
serious and threatened public safety. See infra text accompanying note 264. Congressional discussions and 
debates surrounding the 1996 reforms emphasized this as the justification for crime-based deportation grounds. 
See infra text accompanying note 264. Thus it would not be reasonable for LPRs to conclude that any criminal 
activity (e.g., jaywalking or speeding) would be serious enough to constitute a serious threat to public safety or 
national security. It would be reasonable for LPRs to believe that serious crimes like murder, rape, drug 
trafficking, or sexual abuse of a minor would be the type of criminal activity giving rise to deportation. Yet the 
1996 reforms included a much broader range of criminal activity. Not only is the purchase of a $10 bag of 
marijuana now a deportable offense, so is perjury and receipt of stolen property. See supra text accompanying 
notes 29–30. LPRs should not get a pass for this activity. They, like citizens, should be subject to the 
punishments provided for within the criminal justice system. Deportation, however, should be limited to the 
instances in which it would be proportionate.  
 
34
 Gerardo was not eligible for a Section 212(h) waiver because his aggravated felony was committed 
after his admission as an LPR. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). 
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noncitizens.35 This is a departure from the system that existed before 1996. 
Between 1917, when Congress enacted the first comprehensive post-entry 
crime-based deportation regime, and 1996, a noncitizen’s connections to the 
polity, rather than citizenship status, were determinative of his or her ability to 
remain in the United States after a criminal conviction.36  
The expansion of the aggravated felony definition to include crimes like 
perjury and receipt of stolen property has made noncitizens deportable for a 
wide range of criminal activity. What makes the current system particularly 
harsh is that those with aggravated felony convictions are generally ineligible 
for discretionary relief. Once found guilty of an aggravated felony, deportation 
is a near certainty. This approach to crime and deportation ignores the various 
liberty interests that noncitizens can have in remaining in the United States and 
it allows for disproportionate outcomes. 
II. JUS NEXI AND A RIGHT TO REMAIN 
The jus nexi principle provides a basis for noncitizens, specifically green 
card holders, to be recognized as members of the United States polity.37 
Membership status within the polity strengthens these individuals’ liberty 
interest in remaining in the United States. Deportation infringes upon this 
interest and should only be done when it is a proportionate response to an 
immigrant’s activities in the United States. This Part begins by laying out the 
jus nexi principle and then demonstrates the significant role that this principle 
had in protecting noncitizens’ right to remain in the United States. Some may 
contend that this approach to the right to remain devalues citizenship. The final 
section of this Part responds to that critique. 
 
 
35
 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010); Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive 
Deportation, supra note 33, at 121. 
 
36
 Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation, supra note 33, at 107–10; see infra text accompanying 
notes 116–17. Post-entry-conduct deportation grounds are deportation grounds that focus on the activity of 
noncitizens after they have been admitted to the United States. See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION 
NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 6 (2007). The most common post-entry-conduct grounds are 
based on criminal convictions in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a). These deportation grounds are 
contrasted with what Daniel Kanstroom refers to as “extended border control” deportation grounds. See 
KANSTROOM, supra, at 5–6. These deportation grounds require the deportation of individuals who should 
never have been admitted or who have violated the terms of their admission. See id. at 5.  
 
37
 SHACHAR, supra note 16, at 164–66. 
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A. Jus Nexi 
1. The Connection Principle 
Ayelet Shachar has argued that citizenship should be available based on the 
jus nexi principle in addition to, or instead of, the jus sanguinis and jus soli 
principles.38 The jus nexi principle supports allocating citizenship based on an 
individual’s genuine connection to a polity rather than a bloodline connection 
to the State or birth within the State’s territory.39 Within this framework 
political membership is conveyed based on “connection, union, or linkage” to 
the state of residence.40 The emphasis is on the “social fact of membership.”41 
The social fact of membership is evident when an individual has a “genuine 
connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence 
of reciprocal rights and duties” with a specific state.42 This can be said to exist 
when “an individual’s long-term circumstances of life . . . link her own well-
being to a particular polity.”43 
Shachar’s jus nexi principle draws on “the growing acceptance of the 
genuine-connection criterion in court decisions, regulatory regimes, and 
academic commentaries.”44 For example, in 1955 the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) adopted a “functional, genuine-connection” test to determine 
whether to give international effect to a naturalized citizen’s new citizenship.45 
In the Nottebohm Case, a German citizen resided in Guatemala for the 
majority of his adult life, but was naturalized and became a citizen of 
Liechtenstein in 1939.46 Guatemala refused to recognize Nottebohm as a 
citizen of Liechtenstein because he had minimal connections to 
Liechtenstein.47 His habitual residence had remained in Guatemala, as did his 
 
 
38
 See id. at 165. The jus soli principle extends citizenship based on birth within the territory. Id. at 7. The 
jus sanguinis principle extends citizenship based on having a blood relative who is a citizen. Id. 
 
39
 Id. at 16. 
 
40
 Id. at 16, 165. 
 
41
 Id. at 165 (emphasis omitted). 
 
42
 Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 6). 
 
43
 Rainer Bauböck, Stakeholder Citizenship and Democratic Participation in Migration Contexts, in THE 
TIES THAT BIND: ACCOMMODATING DIVERSITY IN CANADA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 105, 111 (John Erik 
Fossum et al. eds., 2009). 
 
44
 SHACHAR, supra note 16, at 165. 
 
45
 Id. at 166; see also Nottebohm Case, 1955 I.C.J. at 22–23 (establishing the functional, genuine-
connection test). 
 
46
 Nottebohm Case, 1955 I.C.J. at 13. 
 
47
 Id. at 19.  
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business activities and some of his family ties.48 The ICJ concluded that 
citizenship “constitute[s] the juridical expression of the fact that the individual 
upon whom it is conferred . . . is in fact more closely connected with the 
population of the State conferring nationality than with that of any other 
State.”49 
While Shachar uses the jus nexi principle to advocate for increased access 
to citizenship, I however contend that this principle also supports recognition 
of something less than citizenship—the right to remain.50 The jus nexi 
principle provides a basis for identifying members of a polity. Rather than 
identifying members based on formal status, the jus nexi principle allows those 
with “real and substantive ties” to a polity to be recognized as members 
entitled to certain rights and protections.51 It is my contention that individuals 
with these “real and substantive ties” have a strong liberty interest in remaining 
in the United States.52 
Within U.S. law, immigration-related rights have been extended to 
noncitizens based on the jus nexi principle. Hiroshi Motomura’s notion of 
“immigration as affiliation” captures this perspective.53 “This is the view that 
the treatment of lawful immigrants and other noncitizens should depend on the 
ties that they have formed in this country.”54 Noncitizens’ connections have 
been relevant in determining who is eligible for deportation, who is actually 
deported, who can be admitted to the United States, and who is seeking 
admission. For example, length of residence has been used to define who 
within the noncitizen population is deportable.55 Certain deportation grounds, 
like a crime-involving-moral-turpitude conviction, only apply within the first 
five years of admission.56 A statute of limitations is essentially created that 
exempts long-term residents from the deportation ground.57 Favorable grants 
 
 
48
 Id. at 13, 19. 
 
49
 Id. at 23. 
 
50
 I believe that the jus nexi principle provides a basis for citizenship, but I do not think that citizenship 
status is necessary to protect certain noncitizens’ right to remain in the United States. 
 
51
 SHACHAR, supra note 16, at 166. 
 
52
 See id. See infra Part II.A.2 for further discussion of noncitizens’ liberty interest in remaining in the 
United States. 
 
53
 MOTOMURA, supra note 16, at 10–12. 
 
54
 Id. at 11. 
 
55
 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2012) (declaring an alien deportable based, in part, on a 
conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years (or ten years for an alien having 
lawful permanent resident status) after admission). 
 
56
 Id. 
 
57
 Id. § 1227. 
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of discretionary relief from deportation have also depended on length of 
residence, family ties, employment history, property ownership, business 
connections, and service in the U.S. Armed Forces.58 Additionally certain 
admission categories are based on family connections to the United States, and 
connections more generally have been used to determine whether or not a 
noncitizen is seeking admission.59 
Noncitizens’ connections to the United States are also based on their 
obligations to the polity. For example, territorial presence gives rise to an 
obligation for all noncitizens to pay taxes and abide by state and federal law.60 
Male noncitizens have an additional obligation of registering with the Selective 
Service (the draft).61 
The Supreme Court has utilized the jus nexi principle to allocate rights to 
noncitizens in the immigration context. The various connections and 
responsibilities that noncitizens develop in the United States have played a role 
in determining what rights noncitizens have in the immigration context and 
how those rights will be protected. For example, the Court has repeatedly held 
that noncitizens physically present in the United States or returning to the 
United States have greater due process rights than noncitizens at the border 
seeking admission for the first time.62 This has occurred despite the Court’s 
insistence that admission and residence in the United States are privileges for 
 
 
58
 See, e.g., In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 11 (B.I.A. 1998) (citing In re Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 
584–85 (B.I.A. 1978)); Angela M. Banks, Deporting Families: Legal Matter or Political Question?, 27 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 489, 508–09 (2011). 
 
59
 In a series of cases, the Supreme Court had to determine whether a returning LPR was seeking 
admission. E.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 22–23 (1982); Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 450–53 
(1963); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 591–92 (1953). If the LPR was seeking admission, he or 
she would be subject to the exclusion grounds and receive less procedural protection. See Plasencia, 459 U.S. 
at 25–27. If the LPR was not seeking admission, he or she would not have to contend with the exclusion 
grounds and would be admitted to the United States. See id. In Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, Rosenberg v. 
Fleuti, and Landon v. Plasencia, the returning LPRs had potentially engaged in activity since their initial 
admission that would make them inadmissible. Id. at 23–24; Rosenberg, 374 U.S. at 450–51; Colding, 344 
U.S. at 594–95. Thus, if the exclusion grounds applied, they would be denied the ability to return to their life 
in the United States. In each of these cases, the fact that the noncitizens were LPRs and had resided in the 
United States for significant periods of time influenced the Court’s analysis. See Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32–34; 
Rosenberg, 374 U.S. at 460–61; Colding, 344 U.S. at 592.  
 
60
 Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Rights of Migrants: An Optimal Contract Framework, 84 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 1403, 1410 (2009). 
 
61
 Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 3, 62 Stat. 604, 605. 
 
62
 See, e.g., Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32–33; Colding, 344 U.S. at 596–98; United States ex rel. Knauff v. 
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544–47 (1950); Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 
101 (1903). But see Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212–15 (1953). 
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noncitizens.63 The jus nexi principle helps to explain the additional protections 
for present and returning noncitizens. 
Membership within a polity is a proxy for determining who is so connected 
to the polity that deportation would be an excessively harsh consequence. 
Deportation often deprives noncitizens of the ability to reside in the place that 
they know as home. As Justice Douglas explained: 
[Deportation] is punishment in the practical sense. It may deprive a 
man and his family of all that makes life worth while [sic]. Those 
who have their roots here have an important stake in this country. 
Their plans for themselves and their hopes for their children all 
depend on their right to stay. If they are uprooted and sent to lands no 
longer known to them, no longer hospitable, they become displaced, 
homeless people condemned to bitterness and despair.64 
Joseph Carens echoed this sentiment when he wrote that “there is something 
deeply wrong in forcing people to leave a place where they have lived for a 
long time.”65 This is because: 
Most people form their deepest human connections where they live—
it becomes home. Even if someone has arrived only as an adult, it 
seems cruel and inhumane to uproot a person who has spent fifteen or 
twenty years as a contributing member of society in the name of 
enforcing immigration restrictions.66 
While Carens focuses on deporting unauthorized migrants, his comments about 
connection and membership apply to all noncitizens. Deportation for 
nonmembers may be disruptive and dash hopes for a different or better life, but 
it does not deprive them of their home as it does for members. 
Historically, the right to reside within a particular community has been tied 
to one’s membership status within the community.67 Members could not be 
banished or exiled from their community, but nonmembers could be.68 
Throughout U.S. history different criteria have been used to define members, 
including economic status, adherence to local rules and customs, and length of 
stay within the community.69 During the mid-nineteenth century, U.S. states 
 
 
63
 Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32; Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972); Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542. 
 
64
 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 600 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 
65
 CARENS, supra note 16, at 12. 
 
66
 Id. 
 
67
 See KANSTROOM, supra note 36, at 123–43. 
 
68
 Id. 
 
69
 Id. 
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began prohibiting banishment and exile as a form of punishment in state 
constitutions.70 The state legislatures concluded that the comity costs of 
banishment and exile were too high to maintain the practice.71 Comity does not 
raise the same concerns in the international context, and by 1917 the federal 
government was willing to banish or exile noncitizens based on post-entry 
conduct.72 Yet Congress was not willing to banish “our” criminals because it 
was viewed as a disproportionate response to criminal activity.73 Congressional 
discussions about who is one of “ours” focused on factors related to the jus 
nexi principle.74 
Scholars such as Professors Cox and Posner have critiqued a membership 
approach to allocating immigration-related rights.75 Rather than focusing on 
membership status, Cox and Posner have contended that rights should be 
allocated based on an examination of migrants’ reasons for entering a state and 
the state’s interest in having individuals migrate and remain.76 In the context of 
deportation, Cox and Posner identified flexibility as an important state 
interest.77 Flexibility ensures that the State can terminate the residence of 
noncitizens “any time events change such that the benefits from the migrant’s 
presence no longer exceed the costs.”78 Granting the State maximum 
 
 
70
 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 30; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 21; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 21; ILL. 
CONST. art I, § 11; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 12 (amended 1972); MD. CONST. art. XXIV; MASS. CONST. 
pt. 1, art. XII; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 15; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 15; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19; OHIO CONST. art. I, 
§ 12; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 29; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 8; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 20; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 21; 
W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 5. The banishment and exile prohibited was interstate. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. II, 
§ 21. Intrastate banishment has been held to be constitutional under some of these state constitutions. E.g., 
State v. Collett, 208 S.E.2d 472, 472, 474 (Ga. 1974). 
 
71
 Cf. Wm. Garth Snider, Banishment: The History of Its Use and a Proposal for Its Abolition Under the 
First Amendment, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 455, 466 (1998) (discussing comity as a 
justification for eliminating banishment). Banishment is, however, used intrastate as a condition of release for 
sex offenders. See, e.g., Sarah Geraghty, Challenging the Banishment of Registered Sex Offenders from the 
State of Georgia: A Practitioner’s Perspective, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 513 (2007); Amber Leigh Bagley, 
Comment, “An Era of Human Zoning”: Banishing Sex Offenders from Communities Through Residence and 
Work Restrictions, 57 EMORY L.J. 1347 (2008). 
 
72
 See Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889–90. 
 
73
 See 42 CONG. REC. 2723, 2752–53 (1908). In 1916, Representative Riley J. Wilson said that an 
immigrant who comes “with a good record, with good purposes and good intentions, and makes good when he 
arrives here” should not be deported based on post-entry criminal activity because that immigrant “might be 
our criminal, and it might not be just fair to deport him.” Restriction of Immigration: Hearing on H.R. 10384 
Before the H. Comm. on Immigration & Naturalization, 64th Cong. 15 (1916) [hereinafter 1916 Hearings] 
(statement of Rep. Riley J. Wilson, Member, H. Comm. on Immigration & Naturalization). 
 
74
 See infra Parts II.B and IV.C. 
 
75
 Cox & Posner, supra note 60, at 1407–09.  
 
76
 Id.  
 
77
 Id. at 1407–08. 
 
78
 Id. at 1407.  
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flexibility, however, could be counterproductive.79 If migrants fear that they 
can be removed relatively easily, they are unlikely to make the country-
specific investments that would enable them to succeed and that make 
immigration beneficial for the State.80 Thus Cox and Posner concluded that the 
optimal migration contract will balance the State’s interest in flexibility with 
the noncitizens’ interest in limiting the State’s deportation power.81 
Cox and Posner have contended that this approach to immigrant rights 
provides a wider range of rights and opportunities than a lock-step membership 
approach.82 While the approach offered in this Article focuses on membership 
as the basis for allocating rights, it does not articulate a lock-step approach. 
The right to remain is protected based on a variety of factors in order to allow a 
variety of outcomes. Green card holders’ connections, commitment, and 
obligations to the United States, in addition to the crime committed, are 
evaluated to determine if deportation would be proportionate. The emphasis on 
proportionality grants green card holders the assurances they need and the 
flexibility the government desires. This approach ensures green card holders 
that if they make the effort to socially, culturally, and economically integrate 
into U.S. society they cannot be easily removed. This approach also grants the 
government sufficient flexibility to remove individuals in the specific cases in 
which removal is necessary. 
2. A Liberty Interest in Remaining 
The right to remain is based on an individual’s liberty interest in remaining 
in his state of residence. The U.S. Constitution ensures that no person shall be 
“deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”83 Thus all 
persons’ liberty interests are protected under U.S. law. Yet membership plays a 
decisive role in determining whether an individual has been legitimately 
deprived of her liberty interest in remaining in the United States after a 
criminal conviction. 
The United States Supreme Court first recognized a resident noncitizen’s 
liberty interest in remaining in the United States in 1903 in Yamataya v. 
 
 
79
 Id. at 1407–08. 
 
80
 Id. Country-specific investments include learning the local language and developing social networks. 
Id. at 1407. 
 
81
 Id. at 1408 (arguing that this balance can be achieved “by granting migrants more or less generous 
rights and by making it harder or easier for the government to change those rights”).  
 
82
 Id. at 1408–09. 
 
83
 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
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Fisher.84 Kaoru Yamataya entered the United States on July 11, 1901.85 Four 
days after her admission, an immigration inspector concluded that she entered 
the United States in violation of law because she was a “pauper and a person 
likely to become a public charge.”86 The Secretary of the Treasury ordered that 
she be taken into custody and deported to Japan.87 Yamataya contested the 
deportation order arguing that she had been deprived of liberty without due 
process of law.88 The Court recognized that “no person shall be deprived of his 
liberty without opportunity, at some time, to be heard, before such officers, in 
respect of the matters upon which that liberty depends.”89 Deporting a 
noncitizen “who has entered the country, and has become subject in all 
respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its population, although alleged to be 
illegally here” implicates a liberty interest.90 Before a noncitizen can be 
deprived of this liberty interest, he or she must be given “all opportunity to be 
heard upon the questions involving his right to be and remain in the United 
States.”91 In Bridges v. Wixon a noncitizen challenged his deportation order.92 
The Court explicitly stated that “the liberty of an individual is at stake” in 
deportation cases.93 Echoing a similar sentiment seven years later, Justice 
 
 
84
 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903). The Court has been willing to police the procedures used when liberty 
interests are infringed upon, but not the substantive decisions implicating liberty interests. See id. at 100 
(“Leaving on one side the question whether an alien can rightfully invoke the due process clause of the 
Constitution . . . we have to say that the rigid construction of the acts of Congress suggested by the appellant 
are not justified.”). 
 
85
 Id. at 87. 
 
86
 Id. The Court’s recognition of a noncitizen’s liberty interest in remaining in the United States marked 
an important departure from its 1893 conclusion that a State’s power to deport noncitizens is “absolute and 
unqualified.” Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893). In Fong Yue Ting, the Court 
concluded that international law provided no limits on a State’s power to deport noncitizens and did not 
recognize any individual interests at stake for deportation. Id. at 708. The Court did acknowledge that the U.S. 
Constitution could provide limits, but concluded that the power to deport had been allocated to the political 
branches of government and the courts would not police the substantive basis for deportation decisions. Id. at 
711–13. 
 
87
 Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 87. 
 
88
 See id. at 87–88. 
 
89
 Id. at 101. 
 
90
 Id.  
 
91
 Id. 
 
92
 326 U.S. 135 (1945). 
 
93
 Id. at 154. Bridges was ordered deported for being affiliated with the Communist Party, and the Court 
held that the government misapplied this deportation ground. Id. at 156–57. The Court stated that due to the 
liberty interest at stake with deportation, “[m]eticulous care must be exercised lest the procedure by which [the 
immigrant] is deprived of that liberty not meet the essential standards of fairness.” Id. at 154. While the Court 
has not always required robust procedural guarantees protecting this liberty interest, the Court has consistently 
recognized that deportation affects noncitizens’ liberty interest in remaining in the United States. In Galvan v. 
Press, the Court noted: 
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Douglas stated that he “would stay the hand of the Government and let those to 
whom we have extended our hospitality and who have become members of our 
communities remain here and enjoy the life and liberty which the Constitution 
guarantees.”94 
While recognizing noncitizens’ liberty interest in remaining in the United 
States, Justice Douglas acknowledged that there were limits. He could imagine 
certain noncitizen activities endangering public welfare such that deportation 
would be appropriate regardless of length of residence.95 He invoked the 
proportionality principle to strike the appropriate balance. I similarly contend 
that recognizing that noncitizens have a liberty interest in remaining in the 
United States does not mean that they could not be deported under any 
circumstances. Individuals have a variety of interests, but they are not absolute. 
Individual interests and state interests have to be balanced against one another. 
For example, when an individual has been convicted of a crime she can be sent 
to prison. Imprisonment infringes on an individual’s liberty interest, yet it is 
permitted in light of the State’s interest in protecting public safety. Yet the 
State is limited in how it can punish because constitutional provisions protect 
against disproportionate or excessive punishment. 
The Court has not evaluated whether deportation is a disproportionate or 
excessive punishment because it held in 1893 that deportation is not 
punishment.96 I have previously critiqued the Court’s continued reliance on 
this conclusion in the face of changing deportation grounds.97 In 1893, 
 
[C]onsidering what it means to deport an alien who legally became part of the American 
community, and the extent to which, since he is a ‘person,’ an alien has the same protection for 
his life, liberty and property under the Due Process Clause as is afforded to a citizen, deportation 
without permitting the alien to prove that he was unaware of the Communist Party’s advocacy of 
violence strikes one with a sense of harsh incongruity. 
347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954).  
Recognizing the liberty interests implicated by deportation is the basis for the Court requiring that 
deportation proceedings adhere to constitutional due process requirements. See Hiroshi Motomura, The 
Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992). Since Yamataya, the Court has provided robust judicial review of claims 
alleging that deportation proceedings violate procedural due process. See BOSNIAK, supra note 16, at 51. 
 
94
 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 601 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 
95
 Id. (noting that there could be “occasions when the continued presence of an alien, no matter how long 
he may have been here, would be hostile to the safety or welfare of the Nation due to the nature of his 
conduct”). 
 
96
 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 709, 730 (1893). 
 
97
 Banks, supra note 11, at 1659–63. 
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deportation was used to rectify admissions mistakes.98 It was not until 1917 
that Congress enacted a comprehensive regime whereby post-entry criminal 
activity was the basis for deportation.99 The Supreme Court has recently 
recognized the punitive nature of such deportation in Padilla v. Kentucky.100 In 
this case the Court acknowledged that “deportation is an integral part—indeed, 
sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on 
noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”101 
While there is a growing judicial awareness of the punitive nature of 
deportation, the Court has recognized the liberty interests at stake with 
deportation since 1903. The jus nexi principle assists in determining when 
deportation is disproportionate and thus an illegitimate deprivation of that 
liberty interest. 
B. The Historical Case 
In 1917 Congress considered noncitizen connections to the polity relevant 
in determining who would be deportable based on post-entry criminal activity. 
Length of residence within the United States and citizenship were the two 
factors most commonly discussed.102 This section demonstrates how Congress 
reached a consensus in 1917 that eligibility for deportation should be based on 
the jus nexi principle rather than citizenship status. 
Some members of Congress argued that foreign-born residents should be 
deportable based on post-entry conduct until the time that they became 
citizens.103 Others were concerned that citizenship was an under-inclusive 
 
 
98
 Id. at 1651. 
 
99
 KANSTROOM, supra note 36, at 133. 
 
100
 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 
101
 Id. at 1480 (footnote omitted). 
 
102
 Aaron Levy of the National Liberal Immigration League remarked that “it is a difficult question to 
determine just what is the right limit to impose.” Hearing Relative to the Dillingham Bill, S. 3175, to Regulate 
the Immigration of Aliens to and the Residence of Aliens in the United States: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Immigration & Naturalization, 62nd Cong. 44 (1912) [hereinafter 1912 Hearings]. 
 
103
 An interesting constitutional concern raised during the debates was whether Congress had the authority 
to deport a noncitizen regardless of how long he or she had resided in the United States. In 1916, the provision 
before the House required the criminal conviction to be based on an act committed within five years of entry. 
53 CONG. REC. 5165 (1916). Representative Bennet explained that the House Immigration and Naturalization 
Committee chose five years because it was concerned that deportation based on a criminal act any time after 
admission would be unconstitutional. Id. Basing his concerns on a Supreme Court opinion, he stated that 
Justice Holmes had intimated that “you could not provide that an alien could be deported at any time; that 
there had to be a limit, and that the length of time for deportation was analogous to the time in which a person 
could be naturalized.” Id. Representative Bennet was quickly corrected by Representatives Burnett and Sabath. 
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proxy for membership and that length of residence in the United States better 
identified members entitled to remain. Proponents of crime-based deportation 
thought that if an immigrant naturalized then “he takes his chance with the rest 
of us, but until he assumes the responsibilities of citizenship with the rest of us, 
he should be subject to deportation if he shows that he is not the kind of man 
we want here.”104 For Arthur Woods, the police commissioner of New York 
City, membership categories less than citizen did not entail the same level of 
responsibilities, and thus should not support a right to remain.105 This idea was 
shared by Representative Bennet of New York who introduced the bills in 
1908, 1910, and 1911 providing for post-entry crime-based deportation.106 
Representative Bennet’s proposals would have made all noncitizens deportable 
if convicted of a serious crime.107 It did not matter how long the noncitizen had 
resided in the United States, what connections he or she had, or what impact 
deportation would have on United States interests. These proposals were not 
enacted because a congressional consensus developed that some noncitizens 
were “ours” even though they had not naturalized.108 
In 1917 the jus nexi principle was operationalized as length of residence in 
the United States. Noncitizens were only deportable for a crime involving 
moral turpitude within the first five years of admission.109 Congress presumed 
that noncitizens developed a genuine connection to the United States in five 
years.110 Deportation for a single conviction for a crime involving moral 
turpitude after five years was viewed as disproportionate.111 Congress reached 
a different conclusion regarding the proportionality of deporting long-term 
 
Id. at 5165–68. Representative Burnett informed the House that the case referred to by Representative Bennet 
had been overruled in 1914. Id. at 5165 (referencing Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78 (1914)). Representative 
Sabath reminded the House that existing law provided for the deportation of noncitizens engaging in 
prostitution any time after their admission to the United States. Id. at 5168. This law had been found 
constitutional and was used to deport 214 prostitutes and procurers by the end of the 1915 fiscal year. Id.  
 
104
 1916 Hearings, supra note 73, at 12 (statement of Arthur Woods, Police Comm’r of New York City). 
 
105
 Id. 
 
106
 Id. at 13.  
 
107
 See 42 CONG. REC. 2752 (1908). 
 
108
 See 1916 Hearings, supra note 73, at 13–14 (statement of Rep. Adolph J. Sabath, Member, H. Comm. 
on Immigration & Naturalization) (“A great many people who have been here a great many years can not [sic] 
due to unfortunate conditions that exist, become citizens. Meanwhile they might have been married; they 
might have an American wife, a woman who has been born here, and they might have two or three children.”). 
 
109
 Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889. The Immigration Act of 1917 made post-
entry criminal activity deportable by making noncitizens with a crime-involving-moral-turpitude conviction 
deportable. See infra Part III.B. 
 
110
 53 CONG. REC. 5165–72 (1916).  
 
111
 Id. 
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residents for prostitution-related crimes and multiple convictions for crimes 
involving moral turpitude.112 
Time provides for the development of connections. If a noncitizen engaged 
in criminal activity after developing the connections that give rise to 
membership, Representative Wilson of Louisiana concluded that the United 
States would have to take responsibility for that. He said: 
Now, I agree with the chairman that the man who may come here 
with a good record, with good purposes and good intentions, and 
makes good when he arrives here, owing to the fact that our 
atmosphere is not so perfect as it might be and his associates might 
not be of the best, might not be entirely responsible for the 
commission of a crime. I feel as if he might be our criminal, and it 
might not be just fair to deport him.113 
Representative Burnett of Alabama agreed with this perspective, and the House 
Committee on Immigration did not take Commissioner Woods’s 
recommendation to provide for deportation any time before naturalization.114 
Five years came to represent the probationary period for becoming part of the 
American community. One needed to reside in the United States for five years 
to become a U.S. citizen, and after residing in the United States for five years 
one could not be deported based on a crime involving moral turpitude.115 
In 1917, Congress decided that the right to remain should extend to those 
who were members of the polity based on the social facts of their lives.116 The 
 
 
112
 Prostitution-related crimes became deportation grounds in 1907. KANSTROOM, supra note 36, at 125. 
This and the subsequent prostitution-related deportation grounds were aimed at rectifying admission mistakes. 
Prostitutes were ineligible for admission and the deportation grounds provided for their removal if they were 
mistakenly admitted to the United States. Id. Initially there was a three-year statute of limitations but 
immigration officers found it difficult to accurately determine a noncitizen’s entry date. Id. Women could 
avoid deportation by claiming admission more than three years prior. Id. at 125–26. The statute of limitations 
was removed to address this problem. Id. Individuals with multiple crimes-involving-moral-turpitude 
convictions were viewed as recidivists and their deportation was deemed proportionate regardless of their 
connections to the United States. 53 CONG. REC. 5169 (1916). 
 
113
 1916 Hearings, supra note 73, at 15 (emphasis added). 
 
114
 The provisions for anarchists and prostitutes are an exception. Noncitizens could be deported for these 
actions any time after admission. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889. 
 
115
 Representative Sabath attempted to change the five-year period to three years in 1916. 53 CONG. REC. 
5169 (1916). He seemed to believe that genuine connections to the United States developed before five years. 
See id. Representative Burnett responded by noting that the provisions for judicial recommendation against 
deportation would mitigate any harshness. Id. 
 
116
 MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 59 
(2004) (noting that the use of statutes of limitations for deportation grounds reflected “the general philosophy 
of the melting pot: it seemed unconscionable to expel immigrants after they had settled in the country and had 
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social fact of membership for noncitizens was determined by examining the 
connections that an immigrant had to the United States.117 Between 1917 and 
1996, factors such as length of residence, military service, community service, 
family ties, community connections, property ownership, and business 
connections to the polity were used to identify members.118 Members were 
seen to have a heightened liberty interest in remaining in the United States, and 
this interest was protected through statutes of limitations and access to 
discretionary relief. 
Congressional conclusions about the proportionality of deportation varied 
between 1917 and 1996. As concerns about national security increased, 
Congress became less concerned that deportation would be a disproportionate 
response.119 For example, the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act added 
numerous new deportation grounds.120 Many of the additions reflected the 
United States’ embroilment in the Cold War and deep concerns about national 
security. Noncitizens were deportable for being members of the Communist 
Party of the United States or advocating communism, failing to comply with 
various provisions of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, and 
engaging in activities prejudicial to the public interest.121 Of the new 
deportation grounds, only two included a statute of limitations—alien 
smuggling and failure to comply with Title I of the Alien Registration Act.122 
The same trend is evident with the 1996 reforms. At that time, Congress 
viewed unauthorized migration and violent drug crimes as serious enough to 
warrant deportation regardless of a noncitizen’s social membership. There also 
 
begun to assimilate”); see also id. at 75 (explaining that unauthorized European immigrants in the late 1920s 
and 1930s “were accepted as members of society” and deporting them “struck many as simply unjust” because 
it “caused hardship and suffering to these immigrants and their families”).  
 
117
 Another factor that was implicitly considered was race and ethnicity. Historian Mae Ngai has 
documented the role of race and ethnicity in perceptions about which immigrants were accepted as members of 
society. She notes that Mexican migrants were less likely to be viewed as members of American society 
despite long-term residence and family ties. Id. at 75, 82. The role of race and ethnicity in shaping ideas about 
membership in American society is beyond the scope of this Article. This Article focuses on the idea that 
noncitizens could be considered members of American society despite their lack of citizenship status. 
 
118
 See, e.g., In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 11 (B.I.A. 1998) (citing In re Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 
584–85 (B.I.A. 1978)). 
 
119
 With the adoption of each law, more and more noncitizens were deportable. While connection became 
less relevant in defining who was deportable, it remained important in deciding which noncitizens actually got 
deported until 1996. 
 
120
 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 241(a), 66 Stat. 163, 204–08 (current version at 8 
U.S.C. § 1227 (2012)). 
 
121
 Id. § 241(a)(6)(C)–(E), (7). Other additions dealt with general criminal matters like convictions related 
to firearms and narcotics and immigration-related crimes like alien smuggling. Id. § 241(a)(11), (13), (14). 
 
122
 Id. § 241(a)(13), (15) (providing a five-year statute of limitations). 
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seemed to be some presumption that unauthorized migrants have few 
meaningful connections to or within the United States to give rise to social 
membership. 
Between 1917 and 1996, the jus nexi principle played an important role in 
determining which noncitizens were considered members and thus not subject 
to post-entry crime-based deportation grounds. Over time concerns about 
national security and public safety have shifted congressional concerns about 
who is a member, yet the jus nexi principle has not been abandoned. 
C. Devaluing Citizenship? 
The conception of membership articulated in this Article is based on 
connections, commitment, and obligation to the state of residence rather than 
legal status. Scholars such as Peter Schuck and David Jacobson have argued 
that the decreasing relevance of citizenship status for legal rights and economic 
opportunities devalues citizenship.123 The lack of significant distinction 
between green card holders and citizens reduces LPRs’ incentive to naturalize 
and “alter[s] the social significance of citizenship.”124 Professor Schuck has 
identified four dangers associated with devalued American citizenship.125 The 
first is compromising effective governance.126 By having a large population of 
noncitizens who are unable to vote, government officials have little incentive 
to identify and respond to the claims of noncitizens.127 This creates a situation 
in which “the gap between power and accountability widens and the potential 
for exploiting non-citizens grows.”128 The second danger is related to cultural 
assimilation.129 In pursuit of naturalization, noncitizens learn English, civics, 
and American history.130 Absent an incentive to naturalize, noncitizens may 
not develop these skills, which are necessary for their incorporation within 
American society and the effective functioning of the United States.131 
Professor Schuck’s third danger is that a devaluation of American citizenship 
 
 
123
 SCHUCK, supra note 17, at 163 (“United States citizenship . . . confers few legal or economic 
advantages over the status of permanent resident alien.”); cf. JACOBSON, supra note 17, at 40 (focusing on 
Western European, and particularly German, experiences).  
 
124
 SCHUCK, supra note 17, at 163–64. 
 
125
 Id. at 171–72.  
 
126
 Id. at 171.  
 
127
 Id. 
 
128
 Id.  
 
129
 See id. at 171–72; see also JACOBSON, supra note 17, at 40 (discussing similar concerns in France).  
 
130
 See SCHUCK, supra note 17, at 172 (noting that citizenship requires “mastery of language and social 
knowledge”). 
 
131
 Id. at 171–72. 
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may undermine the civic virtues underlying democracy.132 If noncitizens are 
able to obtain the benefits of citizenship without the obligations, they may 
develop an “entitlement mentality” and erode “the democratic spirit of their 
communities.”133 Finally, citizenship provides a bond in “polyglot societ[ies] 
like [the United States].”134 In a society without racial, ethnic, or religious 
commonalities, citizenship serves as a basis for commonality.135 Absent 
citizenship, it may be difficult for individuals to transcend their differences. 
My approach to allocating the right to remain takes into account the factors 
that Professor Schuck has identified as making citizenship valuable. The right 
to remain would not be granted to every noncitizen present in the United 
States. Rather it would be available to noncitizens who have the required 
connections, commitment, and obligations to the United States. It is these 
factors—connection, commitment, and obligation—that ensure cultural 
assimilation and adherence to civic virtues. Concerns about government 
accountability can be addressed by extending the right to vote to the 
noncitizens I have identified. At various points in U.S. history, noncitizens 
have been able to vote.136 This right can be extended to individuals based on 
their connections, commitment, and obligations to the United States rather than 
their legal status. Finally, I have less confidence in the ability of citizenship 
status to create bonds of commonality in the United States. Throughout history, 
women and various racial and ethnic groups have struggled to have their 
citizenship status acknowledged and valued by mainstream American society, 
and that struggle continues today.137 Stories about presumed foreignness from 
second- and third-generation Mexican and Latin American immigrants suggest 
that additional work is needed before citizenship status operates as a bond of 
commonality in the United States.138 Consequently, I do not see lower 
 
 
132
 Id. at 172 (“[Democracy] is also a normative order, an ethos that legitimizes certain process values and 
nourishes particular ways of thinking about the means and ends of politics.”). 
 
133
 Id.  
 
134
 Id. 
 
135
 Id.; see also JACOBSON, supra note 17, at 40 (discussing similar concerns in Germany and France). 
 
136
 Leon E. Aylsworth, The Passing of Alien Suffrage, 25 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 114, 114 (1931) (discussing 
history of noncitizen voting in the United States); Cristina M. Rodríguez, Noncitizen Voting and the 
Extraconstitutional Construction of the Polity, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 30 (2010) (same); Sarah Song, Democracy 
and Noncitizen Voting Rights, 13 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 607, 608 (2009) (same).  
 
137
 See, e.g., MIA TUAN, FOREVER FOREIGNERS OR HONORARY WHITES? THE ASIAN ETHNIC EXPERIENCE 
TODAY (1998); see also RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN 
AMERICANS 379–405 (updated and rev. ed. 1998) (discussing the internment of Japanese Americans). 
 
138
 See TOMÁS R. JIMÉNEZ, REPLENISHED ETHNICITY: MEXICAN AMERICANS, IMMIGRATION, AND 
IDENTITY 140–41 (2010); ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA: A PORTRAIT 
BANKS GALLEYSPROOFS1 6/26/2013 11:35 AM 
1266 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1243 
naturalization rates as a significant threat to developing common bonds in the 
United States. By focusing on noncitizens with significant connections, 
commitment, and obligations to the United States, my approach to protecting 
an individual’s right to remain bolsters the essence and substance of citizenship 
rather than devalues it. My approach seeks to identify the reasons why 
citizenship is valuable and measure those factors, rather than relying on 
citizenship status as an effective proxy for those factors. 
The connections that LPRs develop during their residence in the United 
States provide a basis for being recognized as a member of a polity. Legal 
membership is thought to be the “juridical expression” of social 
membership.139 As Professor Peter Spiro has noted, the goal of citizenship law 
is to “map[] the boundaries of community” by tracking “the social facts of 
community membership.”140 Yet, the social fact of such membership is not 
always legally recognized. The social facts of an individual, like Gerardo’s 
life, suggest membership, and he should have a robust right to remain in the 
United States. 
III.  PROPORTIONALITY 
The right to remain is a tool for protecting an individual’s liberty interest in 
remaining in the United States. The connections an individual has with the 
polity, rather than citizenship status, are an important factor in determining 
whether deportation is disproportionate. Since the introduction of post-entry-
conduct deportation grounds in the United States, the proportionality principle 
has guided congressional decision making. 
This Part demonstrates that concerns about proportionality were expressed 
through debates about the seriousness of deportable crimes and the impact 
deportation would have. There was disagreement about how to define crimes 
serious enough to warrant deportation, whether foreign-born residents should 
have to naturalize to escape deportation, if naturalization was not required how 
long should one have to reside in the United States before deportation was no 
longer appropriate, and what role family hardship should play in the analysis. 
Within these debates there was remarkable agreement that deportation based 
on post-entry conduct needed to be proportionate. While there was no love lost 
 
255–58 (3d ed. 2006); ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT, LEGACIES: THE STORY OF THE IMMIGRANT 
SECOND GENERATION (2001). 
 
139
 Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 6).  
 
140
 SPIRO, supra note 16, at 5. 
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for noncitizens committing serious crimes in the United States, there was 
consensus that some noncitizens are significantly connected to the United 
States such that deporting them could be excessive and unjust.141 
A. The Proportionality Principle 
Proportionality is a foundational principle in numerous areas of law.142 This 
principle dictates that punitive measures should be proportionate to the 
wrongdoing. Punitive measures, whether criminal or civil, can restrict an 
individual’s fundamental rights.143 The proportionality principle provides a 
basis for balancing the government’s interest in punishment and an 
individual’s fundamental rights.144 The Supreme Court has recognized the 
importance of proportionality in the criminal and civil contexts.145 In the 
criminal context, this is expressed through the idea “that punishment for [a] 
crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.”146 The Eighth 
Amendment protects against cruel and unusual punishment,147 and the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines seek to provide punishments that are proportionate to 
the seriousness of the criminal offense and the harm to the victim and 
community.148 In the civil context, the Supreme Court has concluded that 
disproportionate punitive damages awards can violate the Constitution’s 
protection of substantive due process.149 In each of these contexts, the 
proportionality principle “provides a basis for ensuring that the appropriate 
balance is struck between restraining fundamental liberty interests and 
 
 
141
 See infra Part V.B for a discussion of how to balance noncitizens’ connections and the seriousness of 
their criminal activity.  
 
142
 Stumpf, supra note 11, at 1687–89 (discussing proportionality in criminal law, contracts, and torts). 
 
143
 In the criminal context, an individual’s physical liberty could be at stake. In the civil context, the 
Supreme Court has held that excessively large punitive damage awards can violate a substantive due process 
right to reasonable punitive damages. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996); TXO 
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453–62 (1993) (plurality opinion); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1991). 
 
144
 Eric Engle, The History of the General Principle of Proportionality: An Overview, DARTMOUTH L.J., 
Winter 2012, at 1. 
 
145
 See Banks, supra note 11, at 1662–71. 
 
146
 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910). 
 
147
 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 
148
 See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003) (noting that grossly disproportionate criminal 
sentences violate the Eighth Amendment); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, introductory 
cmt. (2008). 
 
149
 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); Hudson v. United States, 522 
U.S. 93, 103 (1997) (noting that the “Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses already protect individuals 
from sanctions which are downright irrational); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
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punishment.”150 In 1917, Congress sought to achieve the right balance between 
protecting noncitizens’ liberty interest in remaining in the United States and 
protecting public safety.151 The seriousness of the crime and what impacts 
deportation would have on the deportee, his family, his local community, and 
the country shaped whether deportation was considered a proportionate 
response to criminal activity.152 
B. Defining Serious Crime 
The 1917 Immigration Act marked a significant turning point in the use of 
deportation in the United States.153 With this legislation deportation was used 
to regulate the post-entry conduct of foreign-born residents.154 Foreign-born 
residents who failed to naturalize were now deportable if they were found to be 
anarchists within five years of admission; prostitutes; convicted of importing 
noncitizens for the purpose of prostitution or other immoral purposes; 
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and sentenced to one year or 
more imprisonment within five years of admission; or convicted of more than 
one crime involving moral turpitude with sentences of one year or more.155 
Creating these deportable offenses was not easy for Congress, and it took 
 
 
150
 Banks, supra note 11, at 1655. 
 
151
 See KANSTROOM, supra note 36, at 133–34. 
 
152
 Id. 
 
153
 Between 1888 and 1917, Congress slowly expanded the Executive Branch’s authority to deport 
foreign-born residents. See id. at 91–136. This expansion reflected new strategies for border control. The 1888 
immigration legislation provided for the deportation of foreign-born residents who violated the contract labor 
laws within one year of entry. Id. at 112. Entering the United States in violation of law became a deportable 
offense in 1891. Id. at 115. One year later a revision of the Chinese Exclusion Act authorized the deportation 
of Chinese laborers present in the United States without the government-issued certificate indicating their 
presence in the United States before the enactment of the first Chinese Exclusion Act. Id. at 116. Beginning in 
1907 any noncitizen woman or girl who was working as a prostitute within three years of her admission was 
deportable. Id. at 125. This provision and the other expansions of the deportation authority bolstered the power 
of the government to remove foreign-born residents who should not have been admitted in the first place. See 
KANSTROOM, supra note 36. 
 
154
 In 1907, immigration law provided for the deportation of any noncitizen woman or girl found to be a 
prostitute within three years of her admission. Id. at 125. Daniel Kanstroom has noted that while this looks like 
post-entry conduct-based deportation it is not. This law “actually related to the long-standing attempt to 
prevent the entry of prostitutes into the United States.” Id. The three-year limit made this deportation ground 
difficult to utilize because immigration officers found it rather difficult to accurately determine a noncitizen’s 
entry date. Women could avoid deportation by claiming admission more than three years prior. Id. at 125–26. 
In 1910, the three-year limit was eliminated to address this problem. Id. at 126. Technically the 1907 and 1910 
immigration laws provided for deportation for post-entry conduct, but the target was removing prostitutes who 
should not have been admitted in the first place. Id. at 125. The 1917 Immigration Act was the first 
comprehensive scheme for deporting noncitizens solely based on their behavior while in the United States. 
 
155
 Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889. 
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almost eight years.156 In the early part of the twentieth century it was not 
uncommon to view deportation based on post-entry criminal conduct as 
punishment.157 Accordingly, some members of Congress wanted to ensure that 
any such deportation was proportionate.158 
 
 
156
 See infra notes 160–68 and accompanying text. 
 
157
 At various points during the debates and hearings, this sentiment was expressed. For example, 
Representative Driscoll stated that “it is a punishment to deport a man.” 42 CONG. REC. 2752 (1908). 
Representative Mann noted that he did not think Congress “ought to . . . permit [a noncitizen] to be taken away 
as an additional penalty for a crime he may have committed.” Id. at 2754. He also questioned whether 
additional penalties, such as deportation for post-entry conduct, should be considered before previous 
immigration legislation had been fully implemented. Id. (remarking “Why, now, should we be endeavoring to 
add more penalties before the law we have recently enacted has well gone into effect?”). The idea that post-
entry crime-based deportation is punishment was also acknowledged in discussions about deterrence. 
Representative Burnett stated:  
[O]ne of the worst punishments that could be inflicted on people of some countries—for instance, 
of Russia—would be that of being sent back to his country, and the very threat hung over the 
man of that kind of deportation would be as powerful a stimulus to good citizenship and 
obedience to the law as anything else. 
1912 Hearings, supra note 102, at 44. Aaron Levy of the National Liberal Immigration League made a similar 
comment stating that “in principle there ought [not] to be any objection to holding over the man who desires to 
become a citizen of this country some threat of punishment in case he does not demean himself properly.” Id. 
Those who supported deportation based on post-entry criminal convictions argued that deporting a 
foreign-born resident with a criminal conviction was not punishment; rather, it was the removal of an 
“undesirable citizen.” 53 CONG. REC. 5168, 5170 (1916). This perspective is based on the idea that admission 
to and residence within the United States is a privilege granted to certain foreign-born residents. Once a 
noncitizen demonstrates that they are not deserving of the privilege, removing them from the United States is 
not punishment, it is merely rescinding a privilege offered. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 61-404, at 1 (1910); 42 
CONG. REC. 2752, 2753 (1908). This reasoning mirrors arguments made by the Supreme Court in Fong Yue 
Ting v. United States. 149 U.S. 698, 709, 730 (1893).  
 
158
 Additionally, there was a concern that such deportation grounds would violate the Ex Post Facto 
Clause of the Constitution. For those who saw deportation based on post-entry criminal convictions as 
punishment, the Ex Post Facto Clause posed a significant problem. Due to the retroactive nature of the 
proposals, noncitizens would have been deportable based on criminal convictions obtained before the 
enactment of the new immigration law. These noncitizens would be subject to an additional punishment that 
did not exist at the time they were convicted. Representative Sabath stated:  
I am quite satisfied that this bill, besides being essentially cruel in its effects, is also 
clearly unconstitutional. It conflicts with section 9 of Article I of the Constitution, which 
provides that “no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.” The bill provides that 
“any alien who is now under sentence because of conviction of a felony shall at the expiration of 
his sentence be taken into custody and returned to the country whence he came.” Bishop, in his 
work on Criminal Law, says: An ex post facto law may, with reasonable precision, be defined to 
be one making punishable what was innocent when done, or subjecting the doer to a heavier 
penalty or burden than was then provided. 
42 CONG. REC. 2755 (1908). He reiterated these ideas two years later, this time joined by Representatives 
Küstermann and O’Connell. Again, they were concerned for the following reason:  
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Between 1908 and 1916, debates ensued about which crimes were serious 
enough to warrant deportation. During each series of debates, members of 
Congress disagreed about what terminology accurately described serious 
crimes. In 1908 the concern was about the term felony, in 1910 it was about 
imprisonment for at least one year, and by 1916 it was about crimes involving 
moral turpitude.159 Each of these phrases was considered to encompass minor 
crimes for which deportation was a drastic consequence. Use of the term felony 
caused problems because “[i]n some of our States the stealing of a lamb, a 
chicken, a chunk of coal, a loaf of bread, or anything, no matter how 
insignificant, the selling of liquor, playing cards, or wagering on a horse race 
are made felonies.”160 Determining seriousness based on the length of sentence 
raised similar concerns about uniformity. In 1910: 
[i]n some States violation of laws concerning the liquor traffic is 
punished more severely than in others; in some States, it is said, the 
breaking open of a poultry crate with intent to steal poultry therefrom 
(however small the value of the latter may be) is punishable severely 
as a felony; in a number of States various acts have been declared 
 
[The post-entry crime-based deportation ground] prejudices and affects the offender because of 
his past misdeeds for which he is already serving his sentence. This proviso in said bill is clearly 
retroactive. The cardinal rule of law applicable in this instance is that laws must be prospective. 
Besides, where an offender is now under sentence, this act would, if passed during the period of 
his confinement in a jail, enhance his punishment, one legally pronounced by the court at the 
time of sentence. And of such additional punishment the offender has had absolutely no 
knowledge. 
H.R. REP. NO. 61-404, pt. 2, at 1.  
The Supreme Court did not explicitly answer this question until 1954. That year the Court held that the 
Ex Post Facto Clause had no application to deportation. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954). Previous 
cases like Fong Yue Ting had held that deportation was not punishment and other constitutional provisions 
dealing with criminal law were inapplicable. 149 U.S. at 709, 730. Yet when Fong Yue Ting was decided in 
1893, deportation was not used to regulate noncitizens’ post-entry conduct, rather it was used as a form of 
extended border control. See KANSTROOM, supra note 36, at 122, 124. Due to the significant consequences of 
deportation, the Supreme Court has recently softened its categorization of deportation. In Padilla v. Kentucky, 
the Court held that failure to advise a noncitizen about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea in a 
criminal case could violate the noncitizen’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 130 S. 
Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens frequently referred to deportation based on an 
aggravated felony conviction as a penalty. Id. at 1480–81, 1486. This may signal a new understanding of 
deportation as punishment when based on post-entry criminal convictions. 
 
159
 See infra notes 160–61, 162–68. 
 
160
 42 CONG. REC. 2754 (1908) (statement of Rep. Adolph Sabath). He also noted that the relationship 
between felonies and misdemeanors was being reduced because “at the present time nearly every offense 
punishable with imprisonment in the State prison or penitentiary is a felony. In nearly all the States 
imprisonment in the penitentiary has been made the penalty for almost all misdemeanors, thereby transforming 
them into felonies.” Id. 
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unlawful, while such acts in other States are either not punishable at 
all or are punishable by fine or imprisonment for one year or less.161 
Use of the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” raised the same problems 
as the term felony. Representative Sabath of Illinois explained: 
[A] crime involving moral turpitude has not been defined. No one can 
really say what is meant by saying a crime involving moral turpitude. 
Under some circumstances, larceny is considered a crime involving 
moral turpitude—that is, stealing. We have laws in some States under 
which picking out a chunk of coal on a railroad track is considered 
larceny or stealing. In some States it is considered a felony. Some 
States hold that every felony is a crime involving moral turpitude. In 
some places the stealing of a watermelon or a chicken is larceny. In 
some States the amount is not stated. Of course, if the larceny is of an 
article, or a thing which is less than $20 in value, it is a misdemeanor 
in some States, but in other States there is no distinction.162 
Other members of Congress, like Representative Bennet, felt that the 
phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” conveyed the desired degree of 
seriousness.163 He was supported by individuals such as Arthur Woods, the 
police commissioner of New York City.164 Commissioner Woods testified 
before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization and explained 
that the Secretary of Labor would determine what constituted a crime 
involving moral turpitude and that it was “not a question of watermelons, 
chickens, or coal.”165 Crime-based deportation was justified as necessary to 
protect public safety and develop the desired citizenry.166 Commissioner 
Woods was only interested in serious crime, not “petty crimes—political 
crimes or misdemeanors.”167 He was focused on the noncitizen “who knocks 
down people in the street, who murders or who attempts to murder people, who 
burglarizes our houses with blackjack and revolver, who attacks our women in 
the city.”168 
 
 
161
 H.R. REP. NO. 61-496, pt. 2, at 1 (1910). The report’s authors were concerned that the proposal was 
“too drastic, too sweeping in its effects, and . . . will be found promotive of severe hardships, which in many 
cases amount to cruelty and inhumanity.” Id.  
 
162
 1916 Hearings, supra note 73, at 8. 
 
163
 53 CONG. REC. 5168 (1916). 
 
164
 Id.  
 
165
 1916 Hearings, supra note 73, at 8. 
 
166
 Id. at 14. 
 
167
 Id. at 3. He later reiterated his position stating, “I would not say if he has committed some offense, but 
I say if he has committed a serious crime, a crime involving moral turpitude.” Id. at 8. 
 
168
 Id. at 14. 
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Commissioner Woods’s sentiments were shared within Congress and a 
consensus was reached that crimes involving moral turpitude with 
imprisonment for at least one year were serious enough to warrant 
deportation.169 Consensus on this point was reached only after Congress agreed 
to authorize criminal trial judges to prevent deportation when it would be 
disproportionate by issuing a judicial recommendation against deportation 
(JRAD).170 Congress broadly defined the class of deportable noncitizens, but in 
light of continuing concerns about the range of crimes constituting crimes 
involving moral turpitude Congress provided for individualized proportionality 
decisions by criminal trial judges.171 JRADs provided a procedural mechanism 
whereby the impact of deportation could be taken into account.172 
Congress’s conclusion about what crimes would be the basis for 
deportation was shaped by the idea that deportation was a serious consequence, 
perhaps even punitive.173 In light of the impact that deportation would have, 
members of Congress were only willing to make serious crimes the basis for 
deportation. 
C. Impact of Deportation 
Deporting noncitizens can have positive and negative effects on United 
States interests. Those that supported crime-based deportation highlighted the 
positive effects—removing undesirable individuals and protecting law-abiding 
residents.174 Those with concerns about the new deportation grounds worried 
about family hardship.175 Congress presumed that within five years of residing 
in the United States, immigrants would get married, have children, and deepen 
 
 
169
 See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 
170
 See KANSTROOM, supra note 36, at 134. Another limitation placed on deportations based on crimes 
involving moral turpitude (CIMT) was a five-year statute of limitations. Only within the first five years of 
admission was a noncitizen deportable based on a CIMT conviction. This limitation was based on the sense 
that noncitizens became sufficiently connected, and thus members of the national community, in five years. 
 
171
 Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889–90. See supra Part II for further discussion 
about access to discretionary relief from deportation.  
 
172
 See 1916 Hearings, supra note 73, at 13–14. 
 
173
 See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 
174
 See 1912 Hearings, supra note 102, at 44. Some saw deportation based on post-entry criminal conduct 
as an effective deterrent. See id. Aaron Levy, of the National Liberal Immigration League, had no “objection to 
holding over the man who desires to become a citizen of this country some threat of punishment in case he 
does not demean himself properly.” Id. He did, however, recognize that individual cases may involve hardship 
that the law should address, but he did not think that it was wrong to hold “some threat over the head of the 
man who wants to become part of us.” Id.  
 
175
 See, e.g., NGAI, supra note 116, at 57 (“Critics argued that deportation was unjust in cases where it 
separated families or exacted other hardships that were out of proportion to the offense committed.”). 
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their connections to and within the United States.176 The idea that the spouse 
and children could be United States citizens only increased the importance of 
those connections.177 What would become of the wives and children if the 
husband or father were deported?178 Concerns about family hardship focused 
on two issues: financial hardship and family separation. 
Financial hardship was a congressional concern because of the broader 
societal impact it could have. There was a presumption that the deported 
noncitizen would be a man and the impacted family members would be his 
wife and children.179 There were real concerns that the wife and children would 
become financially destitute and possibly wards of the state. Representative 
Sabath initially raised this concern in 1908 asking: 
What is to become of [the wife and children]? Friendless, the wife 
and children of a felon—a felon by the force of our unfair and 
unequal law, shunned by neighbors, unable to obtain work wherewith 
to earn a living, destitution staring them in the face. Who will provide 
for them? Who will so shape their affairs for them that the children 
may have the advantage of an education and grow up to become good 
citizens?180 
Representative Sulzer of New York expressed a similar concern that year, 
asking “what is to become of his children and what is to become of his wife? 
Where do they go, and what is to become of them?”181 When the issue was 
discussed during the hearings before the House Immigration and Naturalization 
Committee in 1912, Aaron W. Levy, representing the National Liberal 
Immigration League, raised a similar concern.182 He thought that deportation 
based on post-entry criminal activity would create “a situation where we would 
have doubtless a husband deported under the terms of this provision, and a 
 
 
176
 1912 Hearings, supra note 102, at 44 (statement of Rep. Caleb Powers of Kentucky) (noting that after 
five years of residence an immigrant had “established a home, and all that”).  
 
177
 See 42 CONG. REC. 2753 (1908). 
 
178
 See infra text accompanying notes 180–84. 
 
179
 See 53 CONG. REC. 5169 (1916); 42 CONG. REC. 2753 (1908). While there were significant concerns 
about prostitution within the immigrant population, there was little to no discussion of immigrant women 
having spouses or children who would be negatively impacted by deportation. See 53 CONG. REC. 5169 
(1916); 42 CONG. REC. 2753 (1908). A notable exception was a statement from Representatives Goldfogle, 
Sabath, Küstermann, and O’Connell in a minority report in 1910. H.R. REP. NO. 61-496, pt. 2, at 2 (1910). 
They were concerned that “[i]f the convicted person was a woman having a family, though she had prior to the 
commission of her offense lived uprightly, she would have to be deported and separated from her children, 
probably forever.” Id. 
 
180
 42 CONG. REC. 2755 (1908). 
 
181
 Id. at 2753. 
 
182
 See 1912 Hearings, supra note 102, at 36. 
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wife and children remaining charges upon the public for their support.”183 
Representative Sabath reiterated his concern in 1916 stating: 
We may very likely have cases where a man has married within five 
years after his arrival in this country. He may have married an 
American woman and may have children. What will become of his 
wife and his children if he is deported? The danger is not so great if 
we change the limit to three years.184 
The actual separation of families was also seen as a family hardship 
impacting United States interests. Representatives Goldfogle, Sabath, 
Küstermann, and O’Connell recognized that deportation could lead to 
permanent family separation.185 They were concerned that this separation 
would cause a hardship on the wife left behind.186 Their report stated: 
If [the deported individual] were married, then whether his wife was 
an American citizen or his children were born here would be 
immaterial matters, for the deportation would follow just the same. 
Be the wife ever so pure and her children ever so helpless, still in 
some States she could not obtain a divorce and would be compelled 
to remain in a state of permanent separation from her exiled 
husband.187 
Other members of Congress even thought that such separation could constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment.188 
Congress recognized that deporting noncitizens would have an impact on 
families. Deportation could cause financial hardships and family separation, 
which were seen as undesirable and potentially disproportionate outcomes. To 
limit the occurrence of such outcomes, Congress provided for individualized 
review of deportation decisions. 
 
 
183
 Id. at 41–42. 
 
184
 53 CONG. REC. 5169 (1916). 
 
185
 H.R. REP. NO. 61-496, pt. 2, at 2 (1910) (“The deportation would in most cases work a complete 
separation of the alien from his wife and children.”).  
 
186
 Id. 
 
187
 Id. 
 
188
 42 CONG. REC. 2755 (1908). While discussing his constitutional concerns, Representative Sabath 
noted:  
Surely the deportation and separation forever from those nearest and dearest to him of a person 
for any minor offense which we constitute or call a felony is so cruel and unusual a punishment 
as to come clearly within the purview of [the Eighth Amendment] of the Federal Constitution.  
Id. He repeated this concern in 1912, asking, “Would not this be a discrimination? Would this not be an 
unusual punishment, to separate a husband from wife and child?” 1912 Hearings, supra note 102, at 42. 
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D. Protecting Proportionality 
Congress utilized two types of discretionary relief to limit disproportionate 
outcomes in crime-based deportation cases. Criminal trial judges granted one 
type of relief and immigration judges granted a second type of relief. 
Criminal trial judges issued judicial recommendations against deportation 
(JRADs). Members of Congress such as Representatives Goldfogle, Sabath, 
Küstermann, and O’Connell saw JRADs as a critical feature of any post-entry 
crime-based deportation regime.189 At first they wanted trial judges to 
affirmatively recommend deportation to the Secretary of Labor.190 They 
believed that the trial judge was “best able to tell whether the offense is of a 
character so grave, aggravated, and serious as will warrant deportation.”191 
They had faith in the judiciary to determine when deportation would be 
disproportionate.192 They believed that trial judges were sufficiently publicly 
oriented to recommend deportation when it was necessary to protect public 
safety.193 By 1916 the House Immigration and Naturalization Committee 
agreed to allow trial judges to issue recommendations against deportation to 
the Secretary of Labor.194 
 
 
189
 H.R. REP. NO. 61-496, pt. 2, at 2. 
 
190
 Id.  
 
191
 Id. 
 
192
 Id. (“The judiciary may be trusted to determine by way of recommendation to our Government 
whether such convicted person should be deported.”). 
 
193
 Id. They wrote:  
We believe no federal, state, or territorial judge would hesitate for a moment, if he found that the 
welfare or safety of the State actually required it, to recommend deportation of criminals. The 
judiciary may well be invested with the province of making such recommendation, for no judge 
with due regard to the sentiment of the community in which he serves would withhold it in any 
proper case. 
Id. 
 
194
 53 CONG. REC. 5165 (1916). In 1916 the major debate about JRADs concerned when judges should be 
allowed to issue them. See id. at 5169–71. The committee language required the recommendation to be made 
at the time of judgment or sentencing. Id. at 5169. Representative Sabath wanted judges to have additional 
time to ensure that the recommendation got made and that judges had time to become knowledgeable about all 
of the relevant facts. Id. He explained: 
I am trying to give the court jurisdiction so that it can, at any time after imposing judgment, make 
a recommendation that the alien be not deported. I believe this is a fair amendment. Frequently 
during the trial of a case the judge may omit or forget to make a recommendation, and thereby 
the alien may be deprived of the provisions of this act and of the benefits which we are trying to 
give him. 
Id. He was also concerned about the information available to courts at the time of judgment and sentencing 
because “frequently, after the conviction, conditions arise that may lead a judge to make recommendations that 
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Judicial recommendations against deportation remained a part of U.S. 
immigration law until 1990, yet they did not have the mitigating effect 
envisioned by Representative Sabath.195 The potential power of JRADs was 
never realized because judicial authority to issue a JRAD was not widely 
known and was therefore rarely used.196 Professors Taylor and Wright have 
reported that in most jurisdictions JRADs were “‘virtually unheard of.’”197 
While criminal trial judges did not play a significant role in ensuring that 
deportations were proportional, immigration judges exercised their power to 
provide discretionary relief from deportation. 
 
the man should not be deported, whereas if he made the recommendation at the same time he might, in view of 
the conditions that existed then, recommend immediate deportation.” Id. at 5170. His proposal to allow judges 
to make a JRAD any time after sentencing was rejected, as was a proposal by Representative Siegel of New 
York giving judges thirty days after judgment or sentencing. Id. at 5171–72. Later that day, however, the 
House agreed that a judge or a court would have thirty days after judgment or sentencing to make a JRAD. Id. 
at 5174. When Representative Powers offered his amendment to give judges thirty days to issue a JRAD, he 
explained: 
I believe that things might arise within 30 days after the sentence has been passed that would 
completely change the mind of the court and make him aware within that time that he ought to 
make his recommendation when he would not know it immediately after passing sentence. The 
State, under my amendment, is to have due notice of the proposed action of the judge or court. 
Id. This time there was no discussion of the amendment and it became part of the 1917 Immigration Act. See 
id. The debates over Representatives Sabath’s and Siegel’s proposed amendments focused on whether courts 
or judges would have the authority to issue a JRAD after sentencing was complete. See id. at 5171–74. There 
was little debate as to whether judges ought to make such recommendations. See id. at 5164, 5169–72. Even in 
1910 the Acting Secretary of Labor and Commerce did not object to this proposal. H.R. REP. NO. 61-496, at 3 
(1910). He thought that either trial courts or the Secretary of Labor and Commerce should “decide in all cases 
whether the alien convicted shall be deported.” Id. He did, however, object to both institutions having this 
authority, stating that the “responsibility should be on either the court or the Secretary.” Id. 
 
195
 See Margaret H. Taylor & Ronald F. Wright, The Sentencing Judge as Immigration Judge, 51 EMORY 
L.J. 1131, 1148–52 (2002). JRADs were eliminated in a crime control bill that became part of the Immigration 
Act of 1990. Id. at 1150–51. The legislative history is remarkably silent as to why JRADs were eliminated. See 
id. at 1151. JRAD proponents lobbied Congress, but “the issue was never addressed in congressional debates.” 
Id. The elimination of JRADs came along with “the waves of increasingly harsh congressional measures 
intended to crack down on noncitizen criminal offenders.” Id.  
 
196
 Id. at 1148–49. Furthermore the high rates of plea bargains meant that sentencing judges did not have 
JRAD determinations in the record. Id. at 1148.  
Interestingly Immigration and Naturalization Services did not keep statistics on JRAD grants or 
denials. Id. at 1148. The INS did estimate however that it received 3,000 responses for JRADs in the 1990s. Id. 
at 1148 n.63. 
 
197
 Id. at 1148 (quoting United States v. Sanchez-Guzman, 744 F. Supp. 997, 997 (E.D. Wash. 1990)). 
Ironically in 1994 Congress provided for judicial deportation. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 125 (1996). 
Despite congressional conclusions in 1990 that criminal trial judges should not issue JRADs because 
immigration law is so complicated, in 1994 Congress concluded that these judges should be able to deport 
noncitizens. Id. The desire to accelerate the removal of noncitizens with criminal convictions appears to have 
overridden earlier congressional concerns that criminal trial judges may not get the immigration law correct. 
BANKS GALLEYSPROOFS1 6/26/2013 11:35 AM 
2013] NORMATIVE AND HISTORICAL CASES 1277 
The 1952 INA provided two ways in which immigration judges could 
provide relief from deportation in cases where deportation would be 
disproportionate—Section 212(c) relief and suspension of deportation. Section 
212(c) relief was available to LPRs who had resided in the United States for at 
least seven consecutive years.198 Suspension of deportation was available to 
any noncitizen who had been continuously present in the United States for 
seven years, had good moral character, and whose deportation would cause 
extreme hardship to the noncitizen or his or her citizen or LPR spouse, parent, 
or child.199 To make these determinations, immigration judges were directed to 
“balance the adverse factors evidencing the alien’s undesirability as a 
permanent resident with the social and humane considerations presented in his 
[or her] behalf to determine whether the granting of . . . relief appears in the 
best interest of this country.”200 
Immigration judges were trusted to balance the severity of the criminal act 
and the connections to the United States to decide if deportation was 
 
 
198
 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 212(c), 66 Stat. 163, 187 (repealed 1996). Section 
212(c) authorized the Attorney General to admit noncitizens, even if they were inadmissible under the statute, 
if the individual was an LPR “who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of 
deportation, and who [was] returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years.” Id. The 
Attorney General’s discretion was limited to certain inadmissibility grounds. The INA did not authorize the 
Attorney General to waive inadmissibility grounds that addressed national security. See id.  
The language of the statute created a situation in which LPRs who left and were seeking admission 
could have inadmissibility grounds waived, but LPRs who remained in the United States and became 
deportable based on the same activity could not have their deportation waived. For example, if an individual 
had committed a crime involving moral turpitude, Section 212(c) would allow the inadmissibility ground to be 
waived, but not the deportation ground. The Second Circuit addressed this issue in Francis v. INS and held that 
distinguishing between LPRs who have departed the United States and those who have not was “wholly 
unrelated to any legitimate governmental interest.” 532 F.2d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 1976). As such, it failed the 
rational basis test. Id. The Board of Immigration Appeals followed the Francis rule in In re Silva. 16 I. & N. 
Dec. 26, 30 (B.I.A. 1976). Between 1976 and 1996, deportable LPRs could seek relief from deportation 
pursuant to § 212(c). 
 
199
 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 212(c). 
 
200
 In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 11 (B.I.A. 1998) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Marin, 16 I. & 
N. Dec. 581, 584–85 (B.I.A. 1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally:  
Favorable factors considered by immigration judges include[d] family ties to the United States, 
length of residence in the United States, evidence of hardship to the individual deemed 
deportable and his or her family in the case of deportation, employment history, property or 
business ties to the United States, service in the U.S. Armed Forces, value and service to the 
community, proof of genuine rehabilitation from criminal behavior, and other evidence of good 
character. Adverse factors considered by immigration judges include[d] the nature and 
underlying circumstances of the exclusion or deportation ground at issue, additional significant 
violations of U.S. immigration law, a criminal record, and other evidence of bad character. 
Banks, supra note 58, at 509 (footnote omitted).  
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warranted. Immigration judges served as gatekeepers ensuring that deportation 
was a proportionate response to a specific noncitizen’s criminal activity. 
The deportation regime introduced in the 1917 Immigration Act was based 
on two ideas—the jus nexi principle and proportionality. Congress recognized 
that noncitizens may be “ours” based on their connections to the United States 
and that deportation could be a disproportionate response to criminal activity. 
To address this concern, the crime-based deportation regime adopted that year 
created statutes of limitation for deportable criminal offenses and provided for 
individualized review. The normative principles identified in Parts II and III 
provided the foundation for our first comprehensive crime-based deportation 
regime.201 By 1996 it was difficult to see these principles at play in the crime-
based deportation regime. Part IV offers an explanation of this trajectory and 
contends that a return to these principles is necessary for a just deportation 
regime. 
IV.  NEW PERSPECTIVES ON MEMBERSHIP AND PROPORTIONALITY 
The dominant congressional narrative about immigrants and crime in 1917 
recognized that there was variation within the immigrant population. By 1996 
there was little acknowledgement of such variation. During the late 1980s, 
congressional discourse about immigrants and crime was dominated by 
concerns about unauthorized migrants and the impact that the illicit drug trade 
was having on American communities.202 The narrative focusing on 
unauthorized migrants and illicit drugs had the most resonance within 
Congress. Simultaneously the notion of serious crime was expanding. As 
members of Congress began to see a wider range of criminal activity as 
serious, it became easier to view deportation as a proportionate response. This 
Part argues that the dominant narrative about immigrants and crime and a 
broad conception of serious crime have led to a new understanding of 
deportation as a proportionate response to criminal activity. 
 
 
201
 See supra Parts II, III.  
 
202
 See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Commentary, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime 
Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827 (2007); Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard Trujillo, 
Immigration Reform, National Security After September 11, and the Future of North American Integration, 91 
MINN. L. REV. 1369 (2007). 
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A. The Immigrants at Issue 
The congressional discourse surrounding the 1996 immigration reforms 
focused on immigrants being violent criminals who entered the country 
unlawfully. Members of Congress saw a causal relationship between the 
increase in unauthorized migration and an increase in violent crimes.203 For 
example, then-Congressman Schumer stated that “the repeated violence and 
costly burden of criminal aliens is one of the most vexing problems of our 
criminal justice system.”204 He then went on to note that many of these 
criminals “entered the country illegally” and have “forfeited their right to 
reside here.”205 The narrative focused on the unauthorized status of the 
noncitizens engaged in criminal activity. A Senate report on immigrants and 
crime stated that “[c]riminal aliens occupy the intersection of two areas of 
great concern to the American people: crime and the control of our borders.”206 
Representative Bilbray expressed concern about the high rate of recidivism 
amongst unauthorized migrants in Los Angeles County.207 
The legislative histories for the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 and IIRIRA are littered with references to “illegal aliens” and 
“criminal aliens” as the most pressing immigration issues. The terms were 
often conflated and it is not always clear whom the speaker considered a 
“criminal alien.” At times the term was used to refer to all unauthorized 
migrants who entered without inspection (EWIs), sometimes only to EWIs 
who had been convicted of a criminal offense, and other times any noncitizen 
who had been convicted of a criminal offense. The conflation of “illegal 
aliens” and “criminal aliens” made it easier for members of Congress to 
 
 
203
 See infra text accompanying notes 213–23. 
 
204
 Criminal Aliens: Hearing on H.R. 723, H.R. 1067, H.R. 1279, H.R. 1459, H.R. 1496, H.R. 2041, H.R. 
2438, H.R. 2730, H.R. 2993, H.R. 3302, H.R. 3320 (Title IV), H.R. 3860 (Titles II, V, VI), H.R. 3872, and H. 
Con. Res. 47 Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Law, Immigration, & Refugees of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
103d Cong. 117 (1994) [hereinafter Criminal Aliens Hearing]. 
 
205
 Id. 
 
206
 S. REP. NO. 104-48, at 1 (1995). The report also noted that “[c]riminal aliens are a growing threat to 
the public safety and a growing drain on scarce criminal justice resources.” Id. at 6.  
 
207
 He noted:  
In Los Angeles [C]ounty about 40% of illegal aliens are rearrested later for new criminal 
offenses. This last statistic, I believe, is very important. It is important because if we take action 
to deal with criminal aliens and do nothing about the ease of entering the United States illegally, 
then criminal aliens that we deport will continue to re-enter the country and commit crimes. That 
is why I believe that Congress must reform, not just one section of the law, but our nation’s laws 
governing both legal and illegal immigration in their entirety. 
Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 129. 
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conclude that deportation was an appropriate and proportionate response to any 
criminal activity.208 During the 1994 hearings on criminal aliens, 
Representative Becerra asked for clarification as to “what we mean by a 
criminal alien.”209 Information from the Department of Justice officials stated 
that the statistics they had tracked citizenship status, but not immigration 
status.210 The statistics could identify the number of noncitizen inmates, but not 
the number of inmates who were unauthorized migrants.211 Witnesses 
reporting on state prison statistics, however, did indicate the number of 
unauthorized migrant inmates.212 So some witnesses were referring to 
noncitizens with criminal records while others focused on unauthorized 
migrants with criminal records. The variety of immigration statuses within the 
“criminal alien” category was lost on many members of Congress. There was 
very little recognition that the reforms adopted would impact long-term green 
card holders just as much as they would impact unauthorized migrants. The 
limited use of a more complex narrative about immigrants and crime by 
members of Congress made it easier to conclude that deportation was a 
proportionate and legitimate government response to a wide range of criminal 
activities. 
B. Defining Serious Crime 
Congressional concerns about noncitizens and crime were not new in the 
late 1980s. As noted in Part III, this concern led to the enactment of the first 
comprehensive post-entry crime-based deportation regime in 1917.213 What 
was different by the mid-twentieth century was the sense that crime by 
immigrants was a pervasive and consistent threat to American communities.214 
Then-Congressman Schumer remarked that the “Federal Government [was] 
 
 
208
 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 104-48; 142 CONG. REC. 10,053–62 (1996). 
 
209
 Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 140. 
 
210
 Id. at 141, 186–87. 
 
211
 Id. at 140–41, 165–67, 186–87. 
 
212
 Id. at 130 (California); id. at 150 (New York, Florida). 
 
213
 Debates about which crimes were serious enough to warrant deportation did not end with the 
enactment of the 1917 Immigration Act. Between 1917 and 1996, the criminal grounds for deportation based 
on post-entry conduct expanded. See supra text accompanying notes 119–22. 
 
214
 Senator Roth reported to Congress that a subcommittee investigation found that “criminal aliens are a 
serious and growing threat to our public safety.” 142 CONG. REC. 10,054 (1996) (referencing S. REP. NO. 104-
48 (1995)). Representative Hunter noted that there was “a massive drain on the Federal Treasury and a massive 
loss in terms of property loss and human life loss and a misery index with respect to the damage that criminal 
aliens inflict on this country and on our people.” Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 130. 
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failing in its first duty . . . to protect citizens from violent crime.”215 
Representative Lamar Smith made a similar statement one year later. He noted: 
An increasing amount of crime is being committed by noncitizens: 
both legal and illegal aliens. About 25 percent of all Federal prisoners 
are foreign-born. An astounding 42 percent of all Federal prisoners in 
my State of Texas are foreign-born. Recidivism rates for criminal 
aliens are high—a recent GAO study revealed that 77 percent of 
noncitizens convicted of felonies go on to be arrested at least one 
more time.216 
To address this problem, members of Congress sought to make it easier and 
faster to remove immigrants with criminal records. This was achieved by 
expanding the aggravated felony definition and creating expedited removal 
proceedings for aggravated felons.217 But the discourse surrounding the need 
for this expansion was based on the threat that serious drug crimes posed. 
Between 1986 and 1996, numerous hearings were held and debates took place 
examining the issue of immigrants and crime.218 A significant portion of these 
hearings and debates focused on unauthorized migrants’ involvement in 
serious drug-related crimes. The need to create harsh consequences for these 
 
 
215
 Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 117–18. During the 1994 House hearings on the subject of 
noncitizens and crime, then-Congressman Schumer also stated: 
If you look at it through the eyes of our constituents, here we have tens of thousands of violent 
criminals, repeat offenders of the worst kind, many of them who entered the country illegally, all 
of them have forfeited their right to reside here, and yet our system is paralyzed; it doesn’t 
promptly deport these violent criminals.  
Id. at 117. 
 
216
 141 CONG. REC. E330 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 1995). 
 
217
 See Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Citizenship Paradox in a Transnational Age, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1111, 
1123 (2008) (book review). 
 
218
 See, e.g., Removal of Criminal and Illegal Aliens: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration & 
Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 1–3 (1995) (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith, Chairman, 
H. Subcomm. on Immigration & Claims) (supporting enlarging the scope and size of the INS); Criminal Aliens 
Hearing, supra note 204; Criminal Aliens in the United States: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on 
Investigations of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 103d Cong. (1993) [hereinafter Criminal Aliens in the 
Unites States Hearing] (noting the costs involved in re-apprehending deported criminal aliens who reentered 
the country); H.R. REP. NO. 104-518, at 47 (1996); S. REP. NO. 104-48, at 7–10; H.R. REP. NO. 104-22, at 1 
(1995) (recommending passage of the Criminal Alien Deportation Improvements Act of 1995); H.R. REP. NO. 
101-955 (1990) (Conf. Rep.) (dealing with the Immigration Act of 1990); 142 CONG. REC. 26,634–35, 26,669 
(1996) (concerning the cost of immigration and other bills in the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
1997); id. at 10,045 (debating the Immigration Control and Financial Responsibility Act of 1996); id. at 7548; 
141 CONG. REC. 15,038 (1995); id. at 8436 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein on the Illegal Immigration 
Control and Enforcement Act of 1995); 141 CONG. REC. E330 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 1995) (statement of Rep. 
Lamar Smith); 141 CONG. REC. 4396 (1995) (regarding House Bill 668, the Criminal Alien Deportation 
Improvements Act of 1995). 
BANKS GALLEYSPROOFS1 6/26/2013 11:35 AM 
1282 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1243 
crimes did not justify similar consequences for crimes such as perjury or 
receipt of stolen property. Several witnesses and members of Congress raised 
this concern, but they were unsuccessful in persuading Congress. The desire to 
get tough on serious drug-related crime set the tone for dealing with all 
aggravated felonies. 
The hearings and debates on immigrants and crime between 1986 and 1996 
focused on two problems: the cost of crime committed by unauthorized 
migrants and the threat unauthorized migrants’ drug crimes posed to American 
communities.219 Both of these factors ultimately influenced which crimes 
members of Congress concluded were serious enough to warrant deportation. 
Members of Congress testified that states had to shoulder a drastic increase 
in criminal justice costs because of the federal government’s failure to prevent 
unauthorized migration. Unauthorized migrants were said to be responsible for 
increases in crime rates, particularly drug crimes.220 The costs were staggering. 
For example, Congress was informed that California expected to pay $375 
million during the 1994–1995 fiscal year to incarcerate criminals who were 
unauthorized migrants.221 The costs in New York and Florida were estimated 
to be $63 million and $58.6 million, respectively.222 Overall, it was reported 
that federal and state prisons combined spent $723 million annually on 
unauthorized migrant prisoners.223 
In addition to these costs, members of Congress were concerned about the 
type of criminal activity engaged in by unauthorized migrants. During the 1994 
hearings on “criminal aliens,” Congress was informed that there had been a 
“rapid increase in drug related offenses for criminal aliens between 1987 and 
1992” in San Diego County.224 Individuals testified that while drug-related 
offenses were increasing throughout San Diego County, the increase within the 
total population was “markedly slower.”225 The unauthorized migrant 
 
 
219
 Another area that received significant attention was immigration crimes. 
 
220
 See, e.g., Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 132 (statement of Rep. Duncan Hunter). 
 
221
 Id. at 133 (statement of Rep. Richard H. Lehman). In today’s dollars, this would be over $500 million. 
See Inflation Calculator, DAVEMANUEL.COM, http://www.davemanuel.com/inflation-calculator.php (last 
visited June 18, 2013). 
 
222
 Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 150 (statement of Rep. Gary A. Condit). 
 
223
 Id. at 128 (statement of Rep. James H. Bilbray).  
 
224
 Id. at 132 (statement of Rep. Duncan Hunter). 
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population was seen as directly responsible for the increase in drug-related 
crimes.226 In 1990, Senator Graham noted: 
Of the 2,400 criminal aliens the Florida statewide Prosecutor’s 
Office could provide me information on, 657 were convicted on 
cocaine trafficking—over 25 percent. This number indicates the 
magnitude of the problem and the urgency of the need to provide 
States with relief. It is the Federal Government’s responsibility to 
protect our borders. If the Government fails to prevent dangerous 
aliens from crossing our borders, it then becomes the responsibility of 
the Federal Government to help the States cope with the crime and 
the costs of prosecuting criminal aliens. Finally, the Federal 
Government must make sure that dangerous aliens are not on the 
streets, not allowed to commit new crimes, and not caught in a 
lengthy deportation process.227 
This became a persistent theme by the mid-1990s. For example, 
Representative Duncan Hunter testified that “[o]ver half of the felony crimes 
committed by undocumented immigrants in San Diego during 1992 were drug 
related, representing over 18% of the total felony drug offenses in the 
county.”228 Broad terms like drug-related crimes, drug offenses, and drug 
violations were used during the hearings, but it appears that the focus was on 
drug trafficking.229 Kathleen Hawk, Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, 
testified that 81% of the noncitizen criminals in federal prison for drug law 
violations were serving sentences for drug trafficking.230 Another 18% were 
serving sentences for drug importation.231 These figures mirrored general 
trends in federal incarceration. In 1995, 60% of federal inmates were 
incarcerated for drug offenses.232 Drug offenders accounted for over 80% of 
the total growth in federal inmates between 1985 and 1995.233 By the mid-
 
 
226
 The Border Patrol’s seizure of record numbers of narcotics was cited as a “prime indicator of the 
increase in criminal alien behavior in California.” Id.; Criminal Aliens in the United States Hearing, supra note 
218, at 1 (statement of Sen. Sam Nunn) (“Criminal aliens, for example, are widely seen as having been and 
continuing to be a significant part of the Nation’s drug problem. Problems involving criminal aliens also came 
to our attention in a vivid way in 1987 in the aftermath of the notorious Cuban Mariel boat lift.”). 
 
227
 136 CONG. REC. 36,456–57 (1990) (statement of Sen. Bob Graham).  
 
228
 Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 132 (statement of Rep. Duncan Hunter). 
 
229
 See, e.g., id. at 115–16 (statement of Rep. Benjamin Gilman) (referring to “serious criminal activity, 
such as drug trafficking”). 
 
230
 Id. at 167 (statement of Kathleen Hawk, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons). 
 
231
 Id. 
 
232
 CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 164619, PRISONERS IN 1996, 
at 11 (1997).  
 
233
 Id. 
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1990s, drug activity was an important factor in increased rates of 
incarceration.234 
The high drug-related incarceration numbers are not driven by noncitizens 
because they have very low incarceration rates. In 1980, immigrants’ 
institutionalization rate was only 30% of the institutionalization rate for native-
born individuals.235 By 1990, immigrants’ institutionalization rate increased to 
almost 50% of the institutionalization rate for native-born individuals but 
dropped in 2000 to 20%.236 These figures correspond with the evidence 
available since the early 1900s and indicate that there is no connection between 
increased immigration and increased crime rates. In 1910, the U.S. 
Immigration Committee (popularly known as the Dillingham Commission) 
concluded: 
No satisfactory evidence has yet been produced to show that 
immigration has resulted in an increase in crime disproportionate to 
the increase in adult population. Such comparable statistics of crime 
and population as it has been possible to obtain indicate that 
immigrants are less prone to commit crime than are native 
Americans.237 
In 1994, the United States Commission on Immigration Reform reached 
similar conclusions.238 At the time that Congress was debating the 1996 
immigration reforms, evidence demonstrated that increased immigration, even 
unauthorized migration, was not causing or correlated with an increase in 
crime in the United States.239 Evidence, however, did not carry the day. The 
 
 
234
 The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University has found that 80% of 
federal inmates were incarcerated based on drug or alcohol laws; had regularly used an illegal drug; were 
under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time they committed the crime; committed the offense to get 
money for drugs; or have a history with alcohol abuse. NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT 
COLUMBIA UNIV., BEHIND BARS: SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND AMERICA’S PRISON POPULATION 2 (1998).  
 
235
 KRISTIN F. BUTCHER & ANNE MORRISON PIEHL, WHY ARE IMMIGRANTS’ INCARCERATION RATES SO 
LOW? EVIDENCE ON SELECTIVE IMMIGRATION, DETERRENCE, AND DEPORTATION 10 (2005). The 
institutionalization rate covers individuals in correctional facilities, mental hospitals, and other institutions. 
Kristin F. Butcher & Anne Morrison Piehl, Why Are Immigrants’ Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on 
Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
13229, 2007). Researchers have concluded that for men aged 18 to 40, institutionalization closely 
approximates incarceration. Id. at 5–6. 
 
236
 BUTCHER & PIEHL, supra note 235, at 10. 
 
237
 U.S. IMMIGRATION COMM’N, IMMIGRATION AND CRIME, S. DOC. NO. 61-750, at 1 (3d Sess. 1910). 
 
238
 U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY: RESTORING CREDIBILITY 4 
(1994). 
 
239
 The trends from the 1980s and 1990s continued into the twenty-first century. Crime rates declined in 
the 1990s and early 2000s despite historic highs in authorized and unauthorized migration. RUBÉN G. 
RUMBAUT & WALTER A. EWING, AM. IMMIGRATION LAW FOUND., THE MYTH OF IMMIGRANT CRIMINALITY 
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perception that serious crime is caused or aggravated by immigrants 
persisted.240 Although there was significant evidence that noncitizens were 
involved in serious crimes, which increased criminal justice costs for states,241 
a holistic review of criminal justice costs and incarceration rates demonstrates 
that noncitizens were responsible for a small portion of those increases.242 
Testimony about noncitizens and drug trafficking supported the creation of 
a deportation regime that provided for swifter and more certain deportation.243 
Yet the reforms enacted for accelerated and certain deportation were not 
limited to drug traffickers; they were applied to all aggravated felonies. As 
discussed in Part I, when the term aggravated felony was first introduced, it 
referred to specific serious crimes—murder, drug trafficking, and illicit 
trafficking in firearms or destructive devices.244 Through the enactment of 
several laws in the 1990s, the aggravated felony definition was expanded to 
cover a much wider range of criminal activity.245 These laws expanded the 
definition of an aggravated felony to include crimes such as perjury, 
obstruction of justice, a crime of violence, theft (including receipt of stolen 
property), and burglary.246 
The expanded definition was justified as necessary to ensure that 
immigrants who engaged in serious criminal activity would be deported and 
 
AND THE PARADOX OF ASSIMILATION: INCARCERATION RATES AMONG NATIVE AND FOREIGN-BORN MEN 4 
(2007). Between 1994 and 2006, the foreign-born population increased 71%, from 22 million to 38 million. M. 
Kathleen Dingeman & Rubén G. Rumbaut, The Immigration–Crime Nexus and Post-Deportation Experiences: 
En/Countering Stereotypes in Southern California and El Salvador, 31 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 363, 373 (2010). 
During approximately the same time period, there was a 34.2% decrease in the violent crime rate. RUMBAUT & 
EWING, supra, at 4. Additionally, the homicide rate decreased 37.8%, the robbery rate dropped 40.8%, and the 
assault rate fell 31.9%. Id.  
 
240
 RUMBAUT & EWING, supra note 239, at 14. 
 
241
 See, e.g., Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 111 (statement of Rep. Charles T. Canady). 
 
242
 See Butcher & Piehl, supra note 235, at 24 (noting that in 2000, the institutionalization rate of 
immigrants was one-fifth that of native-born Americans). 
 
243
 See, e.g., Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 121 (statement of Rep. Charles E. Schumer). 
 
244
 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469–70 (current version 
at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)). 
 
245
 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. 
C, § 321, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-627 to -628 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(e), 110 Stat. 1214, 1277–
78 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, § 222(a), 108 Stat. 4305, 4320–22 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); 
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501, 104 Stat. 4978, 5048 (current version at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)). 
 
246
 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). 
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unable to return to the United States.247 The Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) Deputy Commissioner, Chris Sale, testified that the expanded 
definition proposed in 1994 included “sufficiently serious offenses” because 
they corresponded to Class A to E felonies under federal law.248 Between 1994 
and 1995, when this issue was discussed in Congress, members of Congress 
also noted that the expanded definition captured “those egregious crimes of 
violence that are often concomitant with drug-related crimes.”249 
Despite this conception of seriousness, some executive officials and 
members of the bar were concerned that the expanding deportation regime 
would result in disproportionate responses to criminal activity. Executive 
officials were particularly concerned about the aggravated felony definition’s 
implications for compliance with the Refugee Convention. Members of the bar 
raised broader concerns about proportionality. The Refugee Convention 
 
 
247
 See, e.g., Criminal Aliens in the United States Hearing, supra note 218, at 51 (statement of Doris M. 
Meissner, Comm’r, Immigration and Naturalization Service) (remarking that the aggravated felony definition 
“is helpful to us because it eliminates certain forms of relief that have been time consuming where effective 
deportation has been concerned”); 142 CONG. REC. 26,635 (1996) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (noting that 
the expanded aggravated felony definition will mean that “[m]ore criminal aliens will be deportable and fewer 
will be eligible for waivers of deportation”); 141 CONG. REC. 8437 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dianne 
Feinstein) (explaining that the expanded aggravated felony definition will “increase the number of criminals 
who would qualify for deportation as having committed [an] aggravated felony”); id. at 4395 (statement of 
Rep. Tillie Fowler) (expressing support for the Criminal Alien Deportation Improvements Act because it 
makes “it easier to deport criminal aliens who have been convicted of a felony”). 
Representative Hunter argued that expanding the definition would “help reduce the admittance of 
recidivist aliens.” Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 132. By 1996, one of the immigration 
consequences of being deported as an aggravated felon was being permanently barred from reentering the 
United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i). Representative Hunter used this argument to justify adding certain 
crimes, including “burglary, child pornography, prostitution, perjury, espionage, alien smuggling, and tax 
evasion” to the aggravated felony definition. Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 134. 
 
248
 Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 194 (statement of Chris Sale, Deputy Comm’r, 
Immigration and Naturalization Service). At that time, Class E felonies were subject to no more than three 
years imprisonment and Class A felonies were subject to life imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3581(b)(5) (1994). 
The same is true today. 18 U.S.C. § 3581(b)(5) (2012). The House Report on the Criminal Alien Deportation 
Improvements Act of 1995 made a similar observation: 
In adding crimes to the list, effort was made to ensure that the overall reach of the 
definition would be consistent with the sentencing guidelines established by the United States 
Sentencing Commission. With only certain limited exceptions, the Committee attempted to 
ensure that all of the crimes defined as aggravated felonies carry a base offense level of at least 
12. These minimums have been selected to ensure that only the most serious crimes, or the more 
serious convictions of lesser crimes, render the alien deportable. 
H.R. REP. NO. 104-22, at 7–8 (1995).  
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 136 CONG. REC. 11,194 (1990). Representative Mazzoli noted that the aggravated felony definition 
was expanded to include “other violent crimes” and “various other extremely serious crimes.” 140 CONG. REC. 
29,219 (1994).  
BANKS GALLEYSPROOFS1 6/26/2013 11:35 AM 
2013] NORMATIVE AND HISTORICAL CASES 1287 
prohibits signatories from expelling or returning a refugee to a country where 
his “life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”250 
One way the United States implements this treaty obligation is through 
withholding of deportation.251 This treaty obligation does not extend to 
individuals who have been convicted of a “particularly serious crime” and are 
a danger to the United States.252 Therefore those with an aggravated felony 
conviction cannot avoid deportation.253 Mary Ryan, Assistant Secretary for 
Consular Affairs at the State Department, and INS Deputy Commissioner 
Chris Sale expressed concern that the expanded definition of an aggravated 
felony included crimes that were not “particularly serious.”254 Assistant 
Secretary Ryan was concerned that the extension of the “definition of 
aggravated felony to some property offenses that, while serious, may not 
provide an adequate or appropriate basis for denial of withholding of 
deportation to an alien who would face a real risk of persecution in the country 
of return.”255 Deputy Commissioner Sale provided testimony that “[t]heft, 
gambling, prostitution, perjury, and failure to appear in court” were “not the 
type of ‘particularly serious crimes’ which would justify denying withholding 
of deportation on account of persecution or threat of torture or death if the 
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 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33(1), July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 
6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. A refugee is defined as an individual who: 
[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and 
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
Id. at art. 1(A)(2). The 1967 Protocol removed the requirement that the events occurred before January 1, 
1951. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(2), Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 
U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Refugee Protocol]. 
The United States became legally bound to the terms of the Protocol on November 1, 1968 and enacted 
implementing legislation in 1980 through the Refugee Act of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 22 U.S.C.); UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, 
STATES PARTIES TO THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL, 
at 4 (2011). 
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 Withholding of deportation is available if the Attorney General “decides that the [noncitizen’s] life or 
freedom would be threatened . . . because of the [noncitizen’s] race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). 
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 Refugee Convention, supra note 250, at art. 33(2); see also Refugee Protocol, supra note 250, at art. 
1(1) (incorporating Refugee Convention, supra note 250, at art. 33(2)). 
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person is returned to the home country.”256 Despite these repeated concerns by 
executive officials, Congress enacted an expanded aggravated felony definition 
that included the problematic crimes.257 
In addition to these concerns, the American Bar Association (ABA) and the 
American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) informed Congress that 
the expanded aggravated felony definition would lead to disproportionate 
deportations.258 The AILA accepted that “those who commit serious criminal 
offenses should be subject to serious consequences, up to and including 
deportation in many cases.”259 Yet it and the ABA saw the new aggravated 
felony definition as including “relatively minor crimes.”260 To illustrate this 
point the ABA explained that “a person convicted of transporting a pig across 
state lines, or stealing a postcard from a mail carrier, would be subject to 
expedited procedures, barred from most forms of relief, including asylum and 
perhaps 212(c), and ineligible for future immigration benefits.”261 AILA 
concluded that the proposed expansion would be “absurd in its result.”262 
The concerns of the ABA and executive officials are stronger today than 
they were in the 1990s in light of the number of long-term residents deported 
for minor criminal activity.263 Despite Congress’s desire to target unauthorized 
migrants involved in violent drug-related crimes, the vast majority of those 
deported under the 1996 reforms have been nonviolent offenders. Between 
1997 and 2010, the United States government deported approximately 1.25 
million immigrants due to criminal convictions.264 Only 24% of these 
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felony conviction who have been sentenced to at least five years imprisonment ineligible for withholding from 
deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B).  
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RIGHTS WATCH, BY THE NUMBERS]. 
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 OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
ACTIONS: 2010, at 4 (2011) [hereinafter 2010 IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS]; OFFICE OF 
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2009 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 97 
(2010) [hereinafter 2009 YEARBOOK]; OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2009, at 4 (2010) [hereinafter 2009 IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
ACTIONS]; OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2008, at 4 (2009) [hereinafter 2008 IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS]; OFFICE 
OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2007, 
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deportations have been due to violent crimes.265 The most frequent basis for 
deportation was a nonviolent drug offense, which include crimes like 
possession.266 Based on the way deportation figures are reported, it is difficult 
to know how many noncitizens have been deported for drug trafficking. 
Research by Human Rights Watch, however, provides some insight. A review 
of deportation data from 1997 and 2007 suggests that deportations based on 
drug trafficking account for at most 16.8% of deportations for which crime 
data is available.267 
Members of Congress rarely raised the concerns raised by the ABA as they 
had in 1917.268 There was considerably less discussion on the record by 
members of Congress challenging the expansion of the aggravated felony 
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INS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1998 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION 
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STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 167 (1999) [hereinafter 1997 
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK]. 
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definition. The late Professor Stuntz argued that rational legislators will 
support legislation authorizing criminal punishment that is appropriate in a 
small number of egregious cases, but excessive in most other cases.269 This 
occurs because legislators risk getting blamed if a horrible case ends with 
punishment the public thinks is lenient and the prosecutor explains that the 
legislator did not provide the “tools necessary to do justice.”270 In agreeing to 
the extreme punishment, Congress is trusting prosecutors and judges to 
exercise their discretion to reach the appropriate result in each case. The 
legislators are assuming that the extreme punishment will not be applied in 
every case. Yet that is exactly what has happened in the immigration context. 
Representative Lamar Smith articulated the dominant perspective about 
immigrants and crime and their right to remain in the United States. He stated: 
Americans should not have to tolerate the presence of those 
who abuse both our immigration and criminal laws. Criminal aliens 
should be on the fast track out of the country. This bill addresses the 
concerns of the American people by giving the INS and prosecutors 
tools they need to expedite the deportation of criminal aliens.271 
This perspective supported the expansion of the aggravated felony definition 
and the conclusion that deportation for these crimes is appropriate and 
proportionate. Members of Congress and others testifying before Congress 
repeatedly justified the expansion of the aggravated felony definition based on 
the idea that it targeted serious criminals.272 The reality has turned out to be 
more complicated. The vast majority of those deported under the 1996 reforms 
have been nonviolent offenders.273 
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 Id. Members of Congress seem to have had similar concerns in the mid-1990s. HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, supra note 12, at 31–32 (recounting statement of David A. Martin, former INS General Counsel, that 
“even when [members of Congress] were presented with sympathetic facts, they just didn’t want to appear soft 
on immigration”). 
 
271
 141 CONG. REC. E330 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 1995) (statement of Rep. Lamar S. Smith); see also Criminal 
Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 112 (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith) (“We on the task force believe that all 
aliens who abuse the privilege of residing in this country by committing aggravated felonies should be 
deported. No excuses, no delay.”); id. at 172 (statement of Rep. Anthony C. Beilenson) (“Bluntly put, an alien 
who has been convicted of a criminal act in this country and has served his or her term in jail or prison should 
not be allowed to remain here.”); S. REP. NO. 104-48, at 6 (1995) (“[T]here is just no place in America for 
non-U.S. citizens who commit criminal acts here. America has enough criminals without importing more.”). 
 
272
 See supra text accompanying notes 247–49. 
 
273
 See supra text accompanying notes 264–67; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12, at 42; 
Hagan et al., supra note 12, at 1809. 
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C. Impact of Deportation 
The deportation of nearly 1.25 million noncitizens due to criminal activity 
since 1996274 has occurred with little examination of the connections that these 
noncitizens have to the United States. Most members of Congress did not see 
the importance of distinguishing between connected and less connected 
noncitizens. Failing to acknowledge such distinctions negatively impacts 
American families. 
1. Congressional Testimony 
Distinguishing among noncitizens with criminal convictions was important 
to some members of Congress, but they were unable to generate a robust 
debate on this issue and persuade their colleagues. Representative Mazzoli, 
Senator Kennedy, and others provided testimony to Congress that offered a 
more complex narrative of immigrants and crime. This narrative included the 
idea that some immigrants with criminal convictions are members of American 
families and the American polity.275 Representative Mazzoli remarked: 
[I]t is a very different ball game if these people are permanent 
residents who may have lived in the San Fernando Valley for 15 
years but decide one day to hold up a convenience store, and a person 
who sneaked across the border a year ago or 5 months ago and 
decided to stick up that same convenience store . . . .276 
Senator Kennedy noted that barring aggravated felons from discretionary relief 
would deny relief to permanent residents for minor crimes.277 An individual 
“could live here productively for 30 years and have an American citizen wife 
and children. But for them, it is one strike and you are out.”278 As an example 
he noted: 
A long-time permanent resident could decide to go fishing. He hooks 
and kills what he does not realize is a rare fish, which is a strict 
liability felony with a mandatory minimum of 1 year. Even though he 
is married to an American and has U.S.-citizen children, he is 
 
 
274
 See supra note 264 and accompanying text. 
 
275
 See, e.g., Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 188. 
 
276
 Id. (statement of Rep. Romano L. Mazzoli, Chairman, Subcomm. on Int’l Law, Immigration, & 
Refugees). 
 
277
 141 CONG. REC. 15,069 (1995) (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy). 
 
278
 Id.  
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convicted, serves his time, and is immediately deported with no 
prospect for judicial review.279 
Senator Kennedy supported Section 212(c) relief because it allowed an 
immigration judge to determine whether the immigrant’s “equities in the 
United States—such as American citizen spouses or children or contributions 
to [his or her] communit[y]”—outweighed the seriousness of his or her 
criminal offense.280 This narrative of a connected member of the polity was 
raised within the congressional debates, but it gained little traction. 
A retired immigration judge, the American Bar Association, and the 
American Immigration Lawyers Association all provided testimony to 
Congress utilizing this more complex narrative. Arvid Boyes, a retired 
immigration judge, recognized that immigrants with criminal convictions could 
be long-term residents with significant ties to the United States.281 He thought: 
[T]he best and the most sensible way of dealing with long term 
resident aliens with ties to this Nation who have committed crimes is 
to leave the resolution of their request for relief under section 212(c) 
in the sound discretion of immigration judges. That is the state of the 
law now, and I approve of it. To simply bar a long term resident alien 
from even seeking section 212(c) relief by making him or her 
statutorily ineligible (because he has been sentenced to a certain 
number of years, as the new amendment proposes to do) is to 
disregard numerous factors that rightly must be taken into account.282 
He believed that the relevant factors included “closeness of a family 
relationship, the emotional need of the alien and his or her spouse to remain 
together in the United States, the likelihood that deportation would cause the 
destruction of a family, [and] the social, psychological and emotional effects 
on young U.S. citizen children.”283 The American Bar Association similarly 
recognized that immigrants with criminal convictions could be members of 
American families.284 Finally, the AILA explained that immigrants’ 
connections to the United States could make deportation a disproportionate 
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280
 Id.  
 
281
 Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 205. 
 
282
 Id. at 206 (statement of Arvid C. Boyes, U.S. Immigration J. (retired)). 
 
283
 Id. at 205–06 (statement of Arvid C. Boyes, U.S. Immigration J. (retired)). 
 
284
 See id. at 200 (statement of Robert D. Evans, American Bar Association) (“The resulting deportation 
may separate U.S. citizen children from their parents or force innocent children to be uprooted to a distant 
land.”). 
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penalty.285 The AILA concluded that barring aggravated felons from 
discretionary relief would “result in the deportation of many lawful permanent 
residents whose crime is far outweighed by the contributions they make to 
their U.S. families and communities.”286 
Department of Justice officials also acknowledged this complex narrative. 
David Martin, former general counsel to the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, noted that Department of Justice officials were “keenly aware” that 
those covered by criminal deportation grounds included “a vast spectrum of 
human character and behavior. Some such criminals are truly dangerous, but a 
large fraction of this class made single mistakes or had shown genuine 
rehabilitation and remorse.”287 INS officials thought that “most such 
deportable aliens should at least be eligible for consideration of release during 
proceedings and for a discretionary waiver of deportation altogether.”288 
The narrative offered by Representative Mazzoli, Senator Kennedy, and 
other witnesses never took hold the way it did in the early 1900s. The 
unauthorized violent criminal narrative prevailed despite the availability of 
evidence to the contrary.289 The prevalence of this misconception is not 
uncommon.
290
 Seventy-three percent of individuals surveyed in the National 
Opinion Research Center’s 2000 General Social Survey thought that it was 
very likely or somewhat likely that “‘more immigrants cause higher crime 
rates.’”291 This dominant perception of immigrants and crime shaped 
Congress’s conclusions about what constitutes a serious crime and whether 
deportation would be a disproportionate penalty. 
2. Social Science Research 
Researchers have documented a variety of negative impacts that 
deportation has on American families. Many families that experience 
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 See id. at 214. 
 
286
 Id. (statement of Warren R. Leiden, Executive Director, and Jeanne A. Butterfield, Senior Policy 
Analyst, American Immigration Lawyers Association). 
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 David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The Real Meaning 
of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 64. 
 
288
 Id. 
 
289
 See supra text accompanying notes 232–40. 
 
290
 See RUMBAUT & EWING, supra note 239, at 14 (noting the persistence of this misconception “among 
policymakers, the media, and the general public”). 
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 Id. at 3.  
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deportation are mixed-status families.292 This means that the family may be a 
combination of U.S citizens (by birth or naturalization), green card holders, 
nonimmigrants, or unauthorized migrants.293 Often the children of deported 
noncitizens are U.S. citizens.294 Between April 1997 and August 2007, 87,884 
LPRs were deported for criminal convictions.295 On average these individuals 
had lived in the United States for ten years.296 These LPRs were the parents of 
approximately 103,000 children, and 86% of these children were United States 
citizens.297 These families are experiencing educational, health, and financial 
hardships that reverberate throughout society.298 
A 2010 study by the Urban Institute examined the impact of deportation on 
children.299 This report was based on a study of 190 children in eighty-five 
families in six locations throughout the United States.300 The study 
“examine[d] the consequences of parental arrest, detention, and 
deportation.”301 The parents in this study “were arrested in work-site raids, 
raids on their homes, or operations by local police officers.”302 This study 
focused on parents who were unauthorized and therefore deportable.303 The 
educational, health, and financial consequences for children of deportable 
parents may differ from children whose parents are LPRs. It is possible that 
LPR parents have more structural support in place so that when they are 
deported the consequences differ. However, the consequences identified in this 
study304 are similar to the consequences identified in studies on parental 
incarceration.305 This suggests that the actual family separation leads to the 
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 See Michael Fix & Wendy Zimmermann, All Under One Roof: Mixed-Status Families in an Era of 
Reform, 35 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 397, 400 (2001) (noting that “85 percent of immigrant families . . . are 
mixed-status families”). The 1998 Current Population Survey indicated that 9% of U.S. families with children 
were mixed-status families. Id. at 399. Eighty-five percent of immigrant families (families with at least one 
noncitizen parent) at this time were mixed-status families. Id. at 400. This translates into 10% of children in 
the United States living in mixed-status families. Id. at 400. 
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 See BAUM ET AL., supra note 12, at 8 (“Available data on children whose parents are absent as a result 
of incarceration suggest that these children may suffer a number of health problems.”). 
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identified consequences. But at this point it is not possible to claim a causal 
link. More data and research are needed to get a more accurate picture about 
the consequences of deportation on children. 
The Urban Institute study found that after the arrest of a deportable parent, 
children missed school, struggled to maintain good grades, exhibited 
behavioral and emotional problems in the classroom, and some considered 
dropping out.306 And a variety of physical and mental health effects have been 
documented in children whose parents have been arrested and deported.307 
For example, over 40% of the children in the Urban Institute study 
experienced behavioral changes within nine months.308 Children’s eating and 
sleeping routines were disrupted and they began having difficulty controlling 
their emotions.309 More than half of the children cried more frequently and 
experienced more fear, and more than a third experienced more anxiety.310 
Other reactions were to become “clingy, withdrawn, angry, or aggressive.”311 
Families experiencing deportation face a loss of income, which impacts access 
to housing and food.312 Families reported frequent moving, moving in with 
relatives to lower housing costs, and losing homes because the cost became too 
great.313 Another result of income loss is food hardship. The Urban Institute 
found that 60% of the households in the study reported having difficulty 
paying for food “sometimes” or “frequently.”314 As a result parents would cut 
back on their food consumption to ensure that their children had enough to 
eat.315 Over 20% of the parents reported that they experienced hunger.316 
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 CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 12, at 49–51; cf. RANDY CAPPS ET AL., URBAN INST., PAYING THE PRICE: 
THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION RAIDS ON AMERICA’S CHILDREN 48–50 (2007) (noting that students missed 
school, and that there were disruptions to academic performance and behavior). 
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 CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 12, at 41–48; see also CAPPS ET AL., supra note 306, at 50–54. Relatively 
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deportation on children are similar to the effects of parental incarceration. See BAUM ET AL., supra note 12, at 
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Members of Congress failed to seriously evaluate these impacts of the 1996 
reforms because the discourse focused on unauthorized migrants involved in 
violent, drug-related crime. 
D. New Conclusions 
The dominant narrative of immigrants and crime led to the elimination of 
Section 212(c) relief in 1996. Later that year the more complex narrative 
offered by AILA and others began to have some impact. Congress enacted a 
new form of discretionary relief to replace Section 212(c) relief: cancellation 
of removal.317 Some form of discretionary relief was needed because the 
existing crime-based deportation regime could be disproportionate. Senator 
Hatch explained the amendment as necessary because “there was some 
concern that there might be certain rare circumstances we had not 
contemplated, when removal of a particular criminal alien might not be 
appropriate.”318 An example of such a situation offered by Senator Hatch was 
“an alien with one minor criminal conviction several decades ago, who has 
clearly reformed and led an exemplary life and made great contributions to this 
country.”319 He stated that in the “unusual cases involving exceptional 
immigrants whose criminal records consist only of minor crimes committed 
many years ago,” relief from deportation would be appropriate.320 
While he did not use the language of proportionality, Senator Hatch’s 
comments reflected the importance of proportionality in a crime-based 
deportation regime. But the legal directives enacted in 1996 did very little to 
effectuate his desired outcome and members of Congress have increasingly 
questioned the proportionality of the regime enacted. In 1999, Representative 
McCollum of Florida introduced the Fairness for Permanent Residents Act to 
mitigate the harsh impact of the IIRIRA (the 1996 reforms).321 In introducing 
the bill, he said: 
Congress made several modifications to our country’s immigration 
code that have had a harsh and unintended impact on many people 
living in the United States. These individuals, permanent resident 
aliens, have the legal right to reside in the country and apply for US 
citizenship. They serve in the military, own businesses and made 
 
 
317
 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2012). 
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 142 CONG. REC. 27,216 (1996) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). 
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valuable contributions to society . . . . Our bill returns balance to our 
existing laws by allowing people with compelling or unusual 
circumstances to argue their cases for reconsideration. The legislation 
does not automatically waive the deportation order, it simply grants a 
permanent resident alien the right to have the Attorney General 
review the merits of his case.322 
Representative McCollum had been a proponent of the IIRIRA, but came to 
see the detrimental impact of Congress’s proportionality conclusions.323 
Representative Conyers of Michigan also sponsored the Restoration of 
Fairness in Immigration Law Act of 2000 to mitigate the impacts of the 
IIRIRA.324 The bill redefined crimes involving “moral turpitude, aggravated 
felonies, and the definition of conviction to limit deportation to the most 
serious crimes” and granted immigration judges discretion to prevent the 
deportation of certain noncitizens when their deportation would result in 
extreme hardship to U.S. citizen or LPR family members.325 Representative 
Conyers explained that the bill “restores fairness to the immigration process by 
making sure that each person has a chance to have their case heard by a fair 
and impartial decision maker. No one here is looking to give immigrants a free 
ride, just a fair chance.”326 That same year Senator Kennedy sponsored a bill 
that similarly redefined deportable criminal offenses and increased access to 
cancellation of removal.327 The bill specifically stated that existing 
immigration laws “punish legal residents out of proportion to their crimes.”328 
None of these proposals have been enacted. The factors that facilitated the 
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 Id. § 2. Additional attempts to provide for more individualized proportionality review include a bill 
sponsored by “Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York . . . [that] would have made non-citizens 
convicted of an aggravated felony with a sentence of less than five years [in prison] eligible for cancellation of 
removal.” See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12, at 36. Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont attempted to 
provide noncitizen veterans additional review by making them eligible for cancellation of removal regardless 
of any criminal convictions. See Fairness to Immigrant Veterans Act of 1999, S. 871, 106th Cong. § 3(a) 
(1999). In 2006, Representative José Serrano of New York introduced the Citizen Child Protection Act, which 
would authorize immigration judges to consider the best interests of U.S. citizen children in deportation cases. 
H.R. 1176, 110th Cong. (2007). 
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enactment of the 1996 reforms continue to prevail and prevent reforms that 
would reevaluate the 1996 proportionality conclusions.329 
The potential for disproportionate deportation decisions increases when the 
variation within the immigrant community is ignored. Important variations 
include immigration status, length of residence, connections to the polity, and 
seriousness of criminal activity. In 1917 this variation was acknowledged and 
the crime-based deportation regime took these factors into account in defining 
deportable crimes and by allowing individualized deportation decisions to be 
made. By 1996 this variation was largely ignored. The narrow focus on 
unauthorized migrants and violent drug crimes led to the enactment of a crime-
based deportation regime that fails to allow for a different proportionality 
analysis for long-term LPRs with minor criminal convictions who are deeply 
connected to U.S. communities. 
V. THE CITIZENSHIP PROXY 
Citizenship is a reasonable proxy for determining who has the requisite 
connections to make deportation disproportionate, but this proxy can be both 
under- and over-inclusive. Use of this proxy causes LPRs’ liberty interest in 
remaining in the United States to be inadequately protected. Section A details 
the ways in which citizenship status is an imperfect proxy and section B offers 
an alternative framework for identifying members based on the jus nexi 
principle. 
A. An Imperfect Proxy 
Naturalization requirements reflect one conception of which foreign-born 
residents are sufficiently connected and committed to be members of the 
American polity. In order to naturalize, an individual must be 1) eighteen years 
old; 2) a green card holder who has resided in the United States continuously 
for five years;330 3) “a person of good moral character, attached to the 
principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the 
good order and happiness of the United States”; 4) able to read, write and 
speak English; and 5) knowledgeable about U.S. history and government.331 
Satisfying these requirements signals that the individual “is in fact more 
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 See supra text accompanying notes 289–91. 
 
330
 The residency requirement is only three years if the individual is the spouse of a U.S. citizen. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1430 (2012). 
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 Id. § 1427; accord 8 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–.2 (2012). 
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closely connected with the population of the [United] State[s] . . . than with 
[the population] of any other State.”332 
The jus nexi principle is operationalized through length of residence 
requirements. Longer periods of residence allow for the development of 
connections that enable one to become part of a state’s social, cultural, and 
economic communities. Relevant connections include employment, family, 
friends, community involvement, and property ownership. Through these 
connections individuals have the opportunity to learn about the nation’s 
fundamental principles and values and to accept and adhere to them. In 1790 
Congress concluded that two years was a sufficient time period to establish 
such connections, but in 1795 concluded that five years was necessary to 
facilitate sufficient acculturation to American values.333 Length of residence is 
a commonly used proxy for attachment. Since 1802 the United States has 
generally considered five years the length of time within which one develops a 
genuine connection and is entitled to citizenship. 
Naturalization is undoubtedly a proxy for commitment to the State. 
Naturalized citizens take an oath to renounce foreign allegiances, to support 
and defend the United States Constitution and laws, and to “perform work of 
national importance under civilian direction when required by the law.”334 This 
oath marks the most significant difference between green card holders and 
naturalized citizens. In deciding to become a United States citizen, an 
individual is publicly demonstrating allegiance and commitment to the United 
States. Yet individuals can have multiple allegiances, and this is acknowledged 
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 Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 6) (referring to the relationship between the 
State of citizenship and all other States). 
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 Naturalization Act of 1795, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 414, 414; Karin Scherner-Kim, Note, The Role of the 
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L.J. 329, 338–39 (2000).  
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remained five years in most cases. The residency requirements were changed as part of the Alien and Sedition 
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Scholars have argued that domestic political concerns led Congress to limit noncitizens’ access to citizenship 
in order to limit their participation in the electorate. See KANSTROOM, supra note 36, at 54. One exception to 
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U.S.C. § 1430(a). 
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through the practical acceptance of dual citizenship.335 Thus, deciding to 
naturalize may not indicate superior loyalty or allegiance to the United States. 
Citizenship status is an under-inclusive proxy for membership in the polity. 
Noncitizens can have a variety of family and community relationships that 
connect them to American social, cultural, and economic communities. 
Commitment to the American polity can be seen when green card holders 
serve in the armed forces, engage in service work to improve their 
communities, or work for the U.S. government. The commitment of members 
of the armed forces and those who work for U.S. federal judges can be seen in 
the oath that they take to uphold and defend the U.S. Constitution. The 
extension of voting rights to noncitizens, historically and today, recognizes the 
under-inclusiveness of citizenship status as the basis for identifying members 
of the polity.336 
Citizenship can also be over-inclusive. Individuals born in the United 
States but raised outside of its borders may have very few connections or 
commitments to the United States.337 Their socialization outside of the United 
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 The United States permits dual citizenship and does not limit the right to remain of dual citizens. See 
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Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122, 125 (1943).  
In allowing dual citizenship, the United States extends the right to remain to individuals who may have 
significant connections, commitment, and obligations to a foreign country. For these individuals, multiple 
allegiances do not preclude them from enjoying the right to remain. The same should be true for green card 
holders. To the extent that they can demonstrate the social fact of membership within the American polity, the 
potential for multiple allegiances should not deny them the right to remain in the United States after a criminal 
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Human Rights has considered a noncitizen’s connections to his or her country of nationality in determining 
whether his or her right to family life has been violated. Banks, supra note 58, at 527–30. 
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29, 2011, at A1 (discussing the increasing number of foreign women who travel to the United States to deliver 
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States could limit their ability to connect significantly to the United States. 
Yet, based on the Fourteenth Amendment, these individuals are citizens 
entitled to all of the rights and protections associated with citizenship, 
including the right to remain.338 As a theoretical matter, my arguments could 
be used to suggest that citizens should, in some circumstances, have their 
rights to remain curtailed. Adopting a regime in which every individual’s right 
to remain is subjected to an inquiry to determine their connections, 
commitment, and obligations to the United States would require significant 
government resources to administer. I do not believe that the cost of such a 
system would be justified because the majority of citizens would satisfy the 
connections, commitment, and obligations standard.339 The same, however, 
cannot be said about LPRs. A significant number of these individuals will 
similarly satisfy the connections, commitment, and obligations standard. The 
additional administrative costs involved in gathering this information during 
the deportation process would be justified to ensure that the liberty interests of 
these residents are protected. 
Gerardo and Antoinette’s stories from the introduction highlight the ways 
in which citizenship can be both an under- and over-inclusive proxy for 
connection and commitment to the United States. Gerardo arrived in the 
United States as a young child and as an LPR with his mother and five siblings 
to join his father.340 After being in the United States for twenty years, Gerardo 
was convicted for selling a ten dollar bag of marijuana to a police informant.341 
After living in the United States for twenty-nine years, being gainfully 
employed, married to a U.S. citizen, and having U.S. citizen children, Gerardo 
was deported due to his criminal conviction.342 
Antoinette was born in the United States but raised in England since the 
age of two. Her entire family lives in England and Antoinette has spent no time 
in the United States since her departure at age two. After returning to the 
United States at the age of twenty-five to pursue graduate studies in the United 
States, if Antoinette sold a ten dollar bag of marijuana she would not be at risk 
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 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 
339
 There has been a lot of national media attention given to stories of noncitizen women travelling to the 
United States to give birth and then leaving to raise their children abroad. The government, however, does not 
keep statistics on these births. See Jessica Vaughan, Birthright Citizenship Report Sparks Debate, CENTER FOR 
IMMIGR. STUD. (Apr. 7, 2011), http://cis.org/Vaughan/BirthrightCitizenshipReport. The Center for 
Immigration Studies estimates the figure to be 200,000 a year. See id.  
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 See McDonnell, supra note 1. 
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 See id. 
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of being deported to England. She would only be subject to a criminal 
sentence.343 Gerardo is arguably more connected and committed to the United 
States than Antoinette, yet Antoinette is the one with the right to remain. 
One of Gerardo’s regrets was not naturalizing.344 Had he naturalized and 
become a U.S. citizen, his fate would have been the same as Antoinette’s. 
Gerardo did not explain why he did not naturalize, but a variety of 
explanations have been offered in the social science literature.345 These 
explanations focus on the individual skills and resources of the immigrant, 
regulatory or bureaucratic barriers to naturalization, the relative costs and 
benefits of naturalizing, and government reception.346 These explanations 
consider a wide variety of factors, but none of them contend that the failure to 
naturalize results from weak connections or a fragile commitment to the United 
States.347 Rather, these theories highlight that the failure to naturalize is often 
related to insufficient knowledge about the benefits of being a citizen or the 
legal detriments of being a noncitizen.348 
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 See BOSNIAK, supra note 16, at 71. 
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 See id. 
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 See GUILLERMINA JASSO & MARK R. ROSENZWEIG, THE NEW CHOSEN PEOPLE: IMMIGRANTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 109–21 (1990) (explaining that the likelihood of naturalizing turns on balancing the costs and 
benefits of doing so); MICHAEL JONES-CORREA, BETWEEN TWO NATIONS: THE POLITICAL PREDICAMENT OF 
LATINOS IN NEW YORK CITY 69–106 (1998) (examining the costs that immigrants face in an effort to explain 
why their decisions to naturalize are difficult to make); SCHUCK, supra note 17, at 163–75 (contending that a 
changing meaning of American citizenship has minimized the incentive to naturalize); Irene Bloemraad, 
Citizenship Lessons from the Past: The Contours of Immigrant Naturalization in the Early 20th Century, 87 
SOC. SCI. Q. 927, 928 (2006) [hereinafter Bloemraad, Citizenship Lessons from the Past]; Louis DeSipio, 
Building America, One Person at a Time: Naturalization and Political Behavior of the Naturalized in 
Contemporary American Politics, in E PLURIBUS UNUM? CONTEMPORARY AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
IMMIGRANT POLITICAL INCORPORATION 67, 71–80 (Gary Gerstle & John Mollenkopf eds., 2001) (discussing 
incentives to naturalize); Alejandro Portes & Rafael Mozo, The Political Adaptation Process of Cubans and 
Other Ethnic Minorities in the United States: A Preliminary Analysis, 19 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 35, 40–41 
(1985) (explaining that whether immigrants naturalize in their host countries depends upon their political 
motivations and proximity to their native countries). See generally IRENE BLOEMRAAD, BECOMING A CITIZEN: 
INCORPORATING IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (2006) (arguing that social 
networks and a government’s attitude toward immigrants affect whether they naturalize); Robert R. Alvarez, A 
Profile of the Citizenship Process Among Hispanics in the United States, 21 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 327 
(1987) (discussing a holistic approach to determining whether an immigrant will choose to naturalize); Irene 
Bloemraad, Becoming a Citizen in the United States and Canada: Structured Mobilization and Immigrant 
Political Incorporation, 85 SOC. FORCES 667 (2006) (advocating an alternative model of citizenship—
structured mobilization—that focuses upon social networks and a government’s policies, to explain whether 
immigrants naturalize); Philip Q. Yang, Explaining Immigrant Naturalization, 28 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 449 
(1994) (proposing a broad framework to explain whether immigrants naturalize, which includes their 
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Citizenship status can be both an under- and over-inclusive proxy for 
membership in the American polity. Numerous noncitizens have deep, 
significant connections, commitment, and obligations to the United States. 
These connections, commitment, and obligations establish bonds that cause the 
noncitizens to be “more closely connected” to the United States than any other 
State.349 Creating a just deportation regime requires recognizing an 
individual’s membership within the American polity. The following section 
outlines an approach for achieving this goal. 
B. Alternatives to the Citizenship Proxy 
Citizenship as a proxy for membership is easier to administer than 
examining a noncitizen’s various connections to the United States. Requiring a 
multifaceted review for every deportable noncitizen would require a significant 
amount of additional resources. Relying on citizenship status uses fewer 
human and financial resources and limits opportunities for inconsistent 
decisions. But there is a middle ground that uses categories other than 
citizenship status as proxies for connections. Rather than making the right to 
remain depend on citizenship status, the system could grant the right to remain 
to categories of noncitizens based on immigration status, length of residence, 
family ties, military service, or other factors that accurately reflect connections. 
Complex, rule-like directives could be used to achieve this goal. Congress 
could create a system like the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that takes account 
of a variety of factors in determining an individual’s punishment.350 Congress 
could amend the INA to condition deportation on age, length of residence 
within the country, or family status. For example, a noncitizen would be 
deportable if convicted of an aggravated felony unless the individual has 
continuously resided in the United States for at least ten years, or unless the 
noncitizen is the spouse or parent of a U.S. citizen or LPR. Complex rules 
could also be used to deal with the seriousness of the criminal-activity prong as 
well. The earlier definitions of an aggravated felony required serving a 
 
 
349
 See Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 6). 
 
350
 The use of sentencing guidelines has been critiqued for limiting the discretion of judges and requiring 
unnecessarily harsh sentences. See generally Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and 
the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420 (2008) (discussing the debates regarding the history of 
discretion); Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993) (discussing the debates regarding the 
history of discretion). This critique speaks to the difficulty of abstract proportionality analyses, but it also 
illustrates what types of rules are enacted when a wide variety of crimes are deemed serious. See Stith, supra, 
at 1453. 
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sentence of at least five years imprisonment.351 This is one way to distinguish 
between crimes where the seriousness can vary. For example, theft could be 
receipt of stolen property worth $500 or $20,000. Length of sentence would 
help to distinguish these cases. 
This approach to membership and proportionality would require Congress 
to investigate and deliberate two issues. First, what connections create the 
social fact of membership such that deportation could be disproportionate? 
Second, what crimes are serious enough to warrant deportation despite these 
connections? These questions were explicitly discussed during the debates and 
deliberations for the 1917 Immigration Act, but they were less central for the 
1996 immigration reforms. Explicitly addressing these questions would allow 
Congress to decide who is sufficiently connected to the United States to have a 
heightened liberty interest in remaining in the United States and when 
deportation is a proportionate response to specific criminal activity. 
The current approach to crime-based deportation relies on a distinction 
between citizens and noncitizens that is often incorrect. When the same or a 
similar level of connection exists for noncitizens and citizens, we should be 
able to implement a deportation system that extends the right to remain to 
those with the requisite connections rather than only to those with the proxy of 
the connections.352 
C. Implications of Abandoning the Citizenship Proxy 
The argument I have offered would limit the State’s ability to deport 
noncitizens. One implication of this approach is that the requirements for 
admission to the United States could increase. For example, in light of a 
reduced ability to deport, the government may seek greater assurances that 
LPRs are unlikely to commit crimes. This could lead to greater background 
checks to obtain a green card. Noncitizens currently seeking entry to the 
United States as an LPR undergo an extensive background check to ensure that 
they do not fall within one of the various crime-based or national-security-
based inadmissibility grounds.353 The use of FBI name checks, FBI fingerprint 
checks, and Interagency Border Inspection Services checks has led to 
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 See Morawetz, supra note 26, at 1955.  
 
352
 See generally SPIRO, supra note 16 (discussing the ways in which citizenship can be an under- and 
over-inclusive tool for identifying members of a national community). 
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 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012).  
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significant delays in the processing of visa applications.354 While additional 
background checks may provide additional information that would limit the 
admission of future criminals, government officials would have to deem the 
cost of obtaining that information less than the financial and security costs of 
noncitizen crime. Gathering additional information for all visa applicants 
would potentially be significantly more expensive than the costs associated 
with noncitizen crime.355 
An additional implication of my approach to the right to remain is that 
individuals who have engaged in violent crimes may remain in the United 
States. This poses less of a concern because the United States has a system for 
addressing these kinds of threats to public safety—the criminal justice system. 
My argument does not limit the criminal justice system’s ability to punish 
noncitizens to the full extent of the law. I do, however, recognize that states 
within the United States feel as though they are unable to bear the fiscal burden 
of noncitizen crime.356 The proportionality principle provides a useful tool for 
balancing these concerns.357 
CONCLUSION 
Deportation is a legitimate tool for enforcing U.S. immigration law, but the 
use of this tool for post-entry criminal activity can be disproportionate. 
Proportionality is a foundational principle in American criminal and civil law, 
which dictates that punitive measures should be proportionate to the 
wrongdoing. The deportation of LPRs for minor criminal activity raises serious 
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 See U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Questions & Answers: Background Check Policy Update, 
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES (Feb. 28, 2008), http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/NameCheckQA_ 
28Feb08.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Questions & Answers]; U.S. Citizenship & 
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CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES (Apr. 25, 2006), http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/security_checks_ 
42506.pdf. In 2008, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services allowed applications to be processed that 
were waiting on the FBI name check, but had passed the other checks. See U.S. Citizenship & Immigration 
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Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 128. Los Angeles County spent $75 million “on deportable 
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questions about the proportionality of the U.S. deportation regime. Pursuant to 
the jus nexi principle, LPRs can be members of our polity based on their 
connections to our social, cultural, and economic communities. As members of 
the polity, deportation can be a significant infringement of their liberty interest 
in remaining in the United States. Protecting these interests requires delinking 
the right to remain from citizenship status. Citizenship status is an under-
inclusive proxy for the connections, commitment, and obligations that are 
relevant for determining when deportation is disproportionate and thus 
illegitimate. Some immigration and citizenship scholars seek to protect 
immigrants’ rights by increasing immigrant access to citizenship and 
encouraging naturalization. I have taken a different approach and argued for 
decoupling the right to remain and citizenship status. The increased coupling 
of citizenship status and the right to remain has created more distinctions 
between similarly situated persons and a less egalitarian society. 
In 1917 Congress recognized the significant hardship that families could 
experience if a long-term resident were deported.358 By 1996 Congress had a 
different understanding of immigrants and crime, and thus a different 
conclusion about when crime-based deportation would be disproportionate. 
The predominant narrative in the late 1980s and early 1990s was simplistic and 
inaccurate. The focus was on unauthorized migrants involved in drug 
trafficking and the violent crimes that accompany it. This narrative allowed 
Congress to conclude that deportation was a proportionate consequence. Yet 
this analysis was extended beyond drug trafficking and related violent crimes. 
The aggravated felony definition was expanded with little discussion about the 
actual seriousness of the new crimes. This has created a system in which 
individuals like Gerardo can be deported for selling a ten dollar bag of 
marijuana. While the criminal justice system did not view his crime as serious 
enough to warrant a prison sentence, he was deported.359 The fact that he had 
lawfully resided in the United States for over twenty years and his wife and 
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 See, e.g., supra Part II.B. The narrative about immigrants and crime was complex. Immigrants were 
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proportionality reviews. This approach to balancing individual hardship and protecting public safety lasted 
until 1996. See supra Part III. 
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children were U.S. citizens could not be taken into account when deciding if he 
would be deported. 
Some members of Congress recognize the harshness of our current 
deportation regime. They have sponsored legislation that would allow 
immigrants’ connections to be considered when deportation decisions are 
made. The success of these efforts depends on an accurate conception of 
serious threats to public safety and a new national narrative about immigrants 
and crime. The new narrative must reflect the variation within the immigrant 
community and resonate with American voters. These are both difficult, but 
necessary, challenges to overcome in order to create a just crime-based 
deportation regime. 
 
